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Abstract
This paper proposes an algorithm to estimate dynamic discrete choice models using aggregate
market share data. The algorithm achieves a computational advantage by decomposing the com-
plicated mapping between market shares and utility ows into two simpler ones. The rst maps
observed market shares to mean choice specic values, and the second then maps to mean utility
ows. In the application, we estimate switching costs in the Medicare Part D market. Our results
indicate a large switching cost of around $1,700, which implies an average welfare loss of $480 as
enrollees choose to remain in sub-optimal plans to avoid switching costs.
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1 Introduction
In many settings, consumerspurchase decisions exhibit dynamics; that is, their choices today
a¤ect choices made in the future. Applications with dynamic demand include durable goods
(consumer electronics, cars) where the product is expected to last into the future; goods where
consumers face switching frictions to switch from one choice to another (TV programs, 401K
plans), experience goods (medicines, beauty products) where learning about the products value
impacts repeat purchases; and addiction (tobacco, video games) or resistance goods (antibiotics)
where consumers grow addicted or develop resistance to the good.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm to estimate dynamic discrete choice models of
product di¤erentiation using aggregate market share data. The method applies to a broad
class of models and is relatively straightforward to implement as compared to other methods.
Being able to use aggregate data o¤ers practical advantages for applications where individual-
level survey or scanner data are not readily available, or available ones are prone to sampling
problems such as selection bias and small sample sizes. The method accommodates forward-
looking consumer behavior; that is, consumers are assumed to incorporate expectations about
the future when making decisions today. Alternative specications that either omit dynamics
or assume consumers act myopically run the risk of biasing estimates of demand parameters,
propagating bias to other parts of the model such as supply-side estimates of rm mark-ups
derived from demand elasticities, and misguiding policy decisions.
The application in this paper considers switching costs in health insurance. Evidence from
individual-level enrollment data documents strong persistence in the demand for health insur-
ance (Carlin and Town, 2009; Handel, 2010), and there are reasons to believe that switching
frictions may drive the persistence. For example, switching consumers must rst overcome
their inattentiveness from having a default option (Madrian and Shea, 2001) to expend time
researching alternative choices. After switching plans, they may need to switch health care
providers and medications and bear any costs of making mistakes while growing accustomed
to a di¤erent plans rules and restrictions. We consider switching frictions from various sources
(such as those listed above) as economic costs that consumers must incur to switch plans.
In our application to Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance plans, we model demand
as a dynamic discrete choice problem. Each year, enrollees either choose to remain in their
existing, default plans or pay a switching cost to select another plan. Consumers are assumed
to be rational forward-looking decision makers who think not only about the contemporaneous
utility they get from a plan, but also the utility they expect that plan (and other plans) to
deliver in the future. Expressed in recursive form, the value of a plan (termed choice specic
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value in Hotz and Miller (1993)) is the plans current ow utility plus the expected discounted
stream of utility ows and paid switching costs in the future. We assume consumers choose
plans which solve their dynamic programming (DP) problem. We model plans as di¤erenti-
ated products. Consumers derive utility from observable product attributes such as monthly
premiums, deductibles, drug copays, and the comprehensiveness of drug formularies (list of
covered drugs) and product qualities known to consumers, but unobserved by the econometri-
cian. We let plan characteristics, both observed and unobserved, evolve exogenously. Year to
year changes in plan characteristics and consumer preferences are the primary factors driving
consumersdecisions to switch plans.
Our estimation procedure is a three-level nested xed point algorithm. In the outer loop
we minimize GMM objective functions based on moment conditions that put restrictions on
the serial correlation of unobserved product qualities. We also include moment conditions that
require observed product attributes and price instruments be orthogonal to unobserved product
qualities. In the middle loop we solve for the xed point of mean ow utilities that equates
model predicted and observed market shares. We break this procedure into two steps. First, we
use numerical inversion to solve for the choice specic values that equate model predicted and
observed market shares. As shown in Hotz and Miller (1993), this is the dynamic counterpart
to the inversion step in Berry (1994) that solves for mean utility values. Second, we employ
an iterated xed point algorithm to recover the mean ow utilities that are consistent with the
choice specic values found in step one. The xed point operator is dened using the functional
relationship between mean ow utilities and choice specic values. The second step calls to
the inner loop which solves the forward looking consumers DP problem using value function
iteration. While solving the DP, we reduce the dimensionality of the state space which is large
due to the large number of available choices, over 40 following Gowrisankaran and Rysman
(2009) (hereafter GR)s method.
The estimated switching cost ranges from $1,500 to $1,700 in our preferred specications.
To put the magnitude in perspective, the estimate is 54% to 60% of the average enrollees annual
prescription drug expenditure ($2,790) and more than the average out-of-pocket spending on
premiums, deductibles, and drug copays ($893).1 This large switching cost estimate is consistent
with other studies that estimate switching costs for health care plans using individual-level data.
The implied average switching probability is 8.8%, which is quite similar to the actual switching
probability.
Methodologically, we contribute to the literature on the estimation of dynamic demand
1MEDPAC, A Data Book: Medicare Part D program,March 2010. Dollar gures are for the year 2007,
deated to 2006 dollars.
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models using aggregate market share data. Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009) is the most
closely related. Our algorithm shares the same outer and inner loop and uses a similar method
to reduce the dimensionality of the state space. The key di¤erence lies in the middle loop.
The middle loop in GR solves for the mean utility ows that equate model predicted and
observed market shares using a xed point algorithm that literally mirrors the BLP contraction
mapping. It is a slowly converging, cumbersome procedure because it does not operate on
any functional relationships generated by the model. The middle loop in our methodology
decomposes this xed point problem into two steps. The rst step exploits the model-derived
relationship between market shares and choice specic values, and the second step exploits the
functional relationship between choice specic values and mean ow utilities. By decomposing
the complicated mapping from aggregate market shares to mean ow utilities into two less
complex ones, our algorithm achieves signicantly faster convergence with more numerical
stability. The trade-o¤ to our methods computational simplicity is that it cannot be applied to
random coe¢ cient models. The GR algorithm accommodates models with persistent preference
heterogeneity through random coe¢ cients. Put simply, GR is the dynamic counterpart to BLP,
and our method is the counterpart to Berry (1994). Given the trade-o¤s, our method is best
suited for dynamic discrete choice models where the convergence of the dynamic BLP algorithm
may not be easily obtained. Convergence can be hampered in cases where some products are
dynamic complements rather than substitutes. Our method is also useful when the identication
of random coe¢ cients is somewhat dubious because of limited information on the initial state of
the consumer type distribution and when random coe¢ cients are not of rst order importance.
Also related is Shcherbakov (2008) who applies GRs nested xed point algorithm to estimate
switching costs in the cable and satellite television industry using aggregate market share data.
He models a forward-looking consumers choice between three alternatives: cable, satellite and
antenna TV. His methodological innovation exploits this simple choice set structure to make
less restrictive assumptions on the state space of the DP problem than in GR and our method.
Besides the methodological contribution, our application contributes to the health insurance
literature. The presence of choice inertia or switching costs in health insurance markets has been
well-documented and studied in many papers. Strombom et al. (2002) use enrollee level data
on plan choices to explore heterogeneity in price sensitivities. They nd that older and sicker
demographics and consumers holding a default insurance option with an employer sponsored
plan are less price sensitive. They attribute the lower price sensitivity to higher switching
costs. Handel (2010) estimates switching costs to study how they alleviate adverse selection
in an employer-sponsored insurance setting. He leverages a natural experiment and individual-
level panel data on choice and medical claims to cleanly identify switching costs separately
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from persistent preference heterogeneity. He nds large switching costs on the same order of
magnitude as our estimates. A limitation of his method is that he treats consumers as myopic.
Ericson (2011) provides descriptive evidence on the presence of switching costs or choice inertia
and proposes an optimal default mechanism in the Medicare Part D market. Keating (2007)
examines the role of switching costs in Medicare Part D using data over the rst two years of
the program. He estimates static demand models separately for 2006 and 2007 while allowing
simulated consumers to receive extra utility in 2007 from sticking to their default plans. He
then infers the switching cost using a similar method to that proposed in Shum (2004). His
switching cost estimate is $744. We contribute to this literature by explicitly estimating a
dynamic model with forward-looking consumers.
Our paper addresses important policy concerns surrounding Medicare Part D and health
insurance reforms. A literature has emerged on Medicare Part D which suggests enrollees
may not be making rational plan choices (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011; Heiss et al., 2006, 2010;
Lucarelli et al., 2008). These papers propose policy recommendations that would limit the
number of choices. We explore whether switching costs and forward looking behavior rationalize
some of the apparent non-optimal choices when consumers are assumed to be only myopic. To
this end, we use our estimates to simulate enrolleeschoices for the years 2006 through 2009. We
nd the welfare di¤erence between the chosen plan in the dynamic model and the static optimal
plan averages just $5.1 in the inception year, 2006. But in subsequent years, after enrollees
are locked-in to their initial choices, the welfare di¤erences increase to a range of $460 to
$480. These larger gures are similar in magnitude to those in Abaluck and Gruber (2011) who
attribute the welfare losses to choice inconsistencies. However, their ndings are based on data
from the inception year, 2006, when we simulate a much smaller welfare loss. Thus, forward-
looking behavior due to switching costs does not explain their ndings. However, if enrollees
tend to make sub-optimal choices when they enroll in Medicare Part D plans for the rst time
and can resolve the problem by switching plans, then policies aimed at reducing switching costs
will be as important as those that help them make the right choices in the rst place. Indeed,
one set of Medicare Part D reforms from the 2010 Patient Protection and A¤ordable Care Act
has already been enacted to minimize switching costs for low income households.2
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briey describe the institutional features
of Medicare Part D and present the model. We describe the estimation algorithm in section
3 and describe the data used for estimation in section 4. In section 5 we report estimates of
2HR 3590 Sec 3302 Improvement in Determination of Medicare Part D Low-Income Benchmark Premium,
3303 Voluntary De Minimis Policy for Subsidy Eligible Individuals under Prescription Drug Plans and MA-PDs,
3305 Improved Information for Subsidy Eligible Individuals Reassigned to Prescription Drug Plans and MA-PD
Plans.
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switching costs and own and cross price elasticities. We also report the average welfare loss
due to switching costs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we describe the model. It builds upon the discrete choice framework of Berry
(1994) and Berry et al. (1995), in which a consumers indirect utility from a product depends
on observed product characteristics and product qualities unobserved by the econometrician.
Before describing the model, we provide a brief background on Medicare Part D.
2.1 Medicare Part D Background
Medicare Part D is a recently enacted program, authorized under the Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003, that provides a prescription drug benet to the Medicare population. The act
requires all Medicare beneciaries to obtain drug coverage that meets or exceeds a minimum
coverage standard; otherwise they face a penalty in the form of higher premiums paid in later
years. Instead of the government o¤ering its own plan, the act established a regulated and
subsidized insurance exchange where beneciaries can purchase individual insurance policies
sold by competing private insurers. Coverage can also be obtained through a group policy
o¤ered by an employer/union under the Retiree Drug Subsidy (RDS) program, an MA+Part D
policy that bundles Medicare Advantage (hospital/doctor coverage) with Part D prescription
drug coverage, or another drug program such as Veterans A¤airs insurance.
The rules permit insurers to freely enter and exit the market. The regulations require
each insurer to o¤er at least one basic plan with coverage characteristics that meet the
minimum standard. They may also o¤er enhanced plans with more generous coverage. Coverage
characteristics such as annual deductibles, drug copay/coinsurance rates, and drug formularies
di¤erentiate plans. Insurers choose the monthly premium and must charge the same amount to
all enrollees regardless of age, demographics, or prior experience. The government subsidizes
a portion of the premium for all enrollees and provides additional subsidies for low income
households under the Low Income Subsidy (LIS) program.
Medicare beneciaries may choose any plan o¤ered in their home market. There are many
choices; the typical market has over 40 plans o¤ered by about 20 insurers. Markets are geo-
graphically separated in 39 regions drawn around state boundaries. Newly eligible Medicare
beneciaries (those reaching 65 years old) must actively choose and enroll in a Part D plan
during an open enrollment period that runs from November 15th to December 31st. Current
enrollees who take no action in the open enrollment period are automatically reenrolled in their
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current, default plans for the upcoming year. They may switch to a di¤erent plan for the
upcoming year by calling the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) or the insurers
during the open enrollment period. It should be noted that insurers may adjust their premi-
ums and coverage characteristics from year to year as market conditions evolve and regulations
adjust. An insurer may also consolidate its plans and carry over default enrollees from the
pre-consolidated plans.
The enrollment procedures are di¤erent for a subset of LIS eligible households deemed dual
eligibles that have both Medicare and Medicaid coverage. They compose about 25% of the
Medicare population. If a dual eligible does not actively select a plan during the open enrollment
period, Medicare will automatically and randomly assign him to an LIS eligible plan. Only
basic plans with premiums set below a threshold are eligible to receive automatically enrolled
dual eligibles.3 For the upcoming year a randomly assigned dual eligible is reassigned to his
current plan if the plan retains its LIS eligibility. Otherwise, the dual eligible is assigned to
another LIS eligible plan.4
2.2 Model Set-up
Let Jmt = f0; 1; :::; Jmtg denote the set of choices available to consumers in market m in year
t. Per regulation, all consumers have the same choice set, and we assume they know all plans
available in their regions.5 Choice 0 is the outside option. Let dit 2 f1; :::; Jmtg denote consumer
is default plan that she would be automatically enrolled in for year t. dit = 0 if the consumer
does not have a default plan. When a plan exits the market, the default for its enrollees becomes
the outside option.6
Consumer is indirect utility from plan j is given as a linear function of plan js current
premium (pjt) and other characteristics (X0jt):
3The threshold is determined by a weighted average of the premiums set by plans, where weights are calcu-
lated using past enrollments.
4There is su¢ cient time for a randomly assigned dual eligible to reject his assignment and actively enroll in
another plan. However, if a dual eligible has ever actively enrolled in a plan, he will never be eligible in the
future for automatic enrollment.
5An alternative modeling approach with explicit search frictions would limit the choice set to the plans that
a consumer has discovered through a search process. We do not adopt this interpretation of search frictions
because the Medicare Part D insurance exchange is designed to be highly transparent. Medicare disseminates
information about all plan o¤erings through many channels including direct mailings, the Medicare.gov website,
and pharmacies. No plan would be hidden from consumers with such information so readily available at their
ngertips.
6From an enrollees perspective, exits are treated as a random event of her default becoming the outside
option. We do not di¤erentiate consumers whose default is the outside option due to exits of their previously
chosen plans from those whose default is the outside option by active choice. Exits in this market rarely occur,
and the market shares of the exiting plans are much smaller than the average market shares. See Table 12.
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uijt =  pjt +X0jtx + jt + ijt   sc  1(j 6= dit) if dit 6= 0
=  pjt +X0jtx + jt + ijt if dit = 0:
jt captures a product attribute or quality that enters a consumers utility but is not observed
by the econometrician. ijt is assumed to be drawn from the type 1 extreme value distribution
independently across consumers, plans, and time periods. We normalize the mean utility ow
from the outside option to be zero so that ui0t = i0t. Persistency in preferences is captured
by time-invariant coe¢ cients  and x, and heterogeneity in preferences is captured by the
Logit error terms, ijt, as in Berry (1994). Thus heterogeneity in consumer preferences is not
persistent. The parameter sc captures the switching cost associated with an enrollee choosing
a plan other than her default plan.
Note that we assume consumers moving from the outside option to an inside option do
not incur a switching cost. Only consumers moving amongst inside options and those moving
from an inside option to the outside option face switching costs. The primary reason for this
modeling choice is that our data starts with the inception of the Part D program in 2006. By
denition no consumer had a default plan, and there was a massive inux of enrollment in
that initial year. We do not want this large wave of enrollment to be rationalized by a low
switching cost estimate. By imposing asymmetry on the switching cost, we can better focus on
our goal of estimating switching costs that rationalize the choice behavior of consumers who
have a default Part D plan.7 There is also a technical issue we encountered in our estimation
algorithm when we allow for switching costs from the outside option. We describe the issue in
section 3, and present illustrative estimates of a modied model in section 5.
2.3 Discussion: Sources of Switching Costs
In economic models, switching costs are parameters that rationalize consumers making repeat
purchases of the same product. The switching costs in our model impose disutility on consumers
who choose plans di¤ering from their default plans. As a result, switching costs induce inertia
in consumersplan choices.
Its worthwhile discussing various sources of choice inertia in our application to health
insurance plans. We should note that there are no explicit penalties for switching Part D plans
like one would face from breaking a contract to switch cell phone carriers. It is also notable that
marketing activities targeting switching behavior, such as new customer sign up discounts and
7Handel (2010) also adopts this view.
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customer loyalty programs, are not sources of switching costs because the Part D regulations
strictly prohibit such practices. Instead there are several indirect switching cost channels. We
classify these costs into broad categories: risk aversion toward products with unknown quality,
search, learning, transaction, and psychological.
First, choice inertia or repeat purchases can arise when products are experience goods and
risk-averse consumers believe that productsvalues are persistent (Klemperer, 1995; Dubé et al.,
2010). In Part D, an enrollee that has developed familiarity with copay prices, restrictions,
and drug coverage under her default plan may be reluctant to switch to another plan with
unfamiliar coverage. Moreover, if a di¤erent plans formulary restrictions require an enrollee to
change medications, there is uncertainty about untested medicines and concerns over possible
adverse physiological consequences. As evidence that Part D enrollees base decisions on prior
experience, Ketcham et al. (2011) nd that an enrollee is more likely to switch plans if she
learns, ex-post, that she could have saved on out-of-pocket costs by choosing a di¤erent plan
in the previous year. Their ndings imply that Part D plans are likely experience goods and
enrollees expect information they acquired in the previous year, whether about their current
plans or their health conditions or the match qualities, to persist.
Second, when products are search goods, their values can be acquired by consumers through
search or comparative research, but there are time and e¤ort costs to do so (Moshkin and
Shachar, 2002; Dubé et al., 2010). For the case of Part D plans, enrollees have to forecast their
demand for a variety of medications and then compare formularies, copays, and coinsurance
rates to calculate expected out-of-pocket expenses. Moreover, they need to acquaint them-
selves with non-monetary characteristics including pharmacy networks and restrictions, such
as requirements to obtain prior authorization, to evaluate each plan. Kling et al. (2012) nd
that comparison friction the wedge between availability of information and consumersuse of
it has a signicant impact on switching behavior. In their experiment, they nd that 28% of
the group of Medicare beneciaries receiving a letter with personalized cost information about
plans switch for the upcoming year, while only 17% of the comparison group, those receiving
a letter with the web address to look up such information, switch. They argue that the inter-
vention reduces the search costs of acquiring information and makes the benets of switching
more apparent, so that more enrollees nd it worthwhile to pay the switching cost to changes
plans. In our modeling framework, we treat search costs as a form of switching costs and do
not distinguish the two.
Note that these two sources regard information asymmetry that can be resolved by experi-
ence and search, respectively. They both lead to choice inertia provided that an enrollee knows
more about his default plan than alternative plans.
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The third source involves learning costs incurred after consumers switch products. Switching
enrollees face costs to learn a new set of plan rules and procedures and may make costly mistakes
during the learning process. For example, on the rst visit to the pharmacy, a new enrollee
might forget to obtain a prior authorization and be denied coverage. These learning costs are
analogous to those described in Klemperer (1995) where the example is that of a PC user
switching to an Apple computer and needing to learn the Apple operating system.
The fourth source is transaction costs. For switching enrollees who need to switch drug
regimens and pharmacies, there are transactions costs involved with doctors visits to obtain
new prescriptions and costs to transfer prescriptions to a new pharmacy.8
Finally, switching frictions can arise from inattention, procrastination or status-quo biases
(Madrian and Shea, 2001; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) and psychological costs (Klem-
perer, 1995; Dubé et al., 2010). We feel that these can be quite relevant to the Part D market
because enrollees are automatically enrolled in their default plans as the result of them doing
nothing. It is also possible that some enrollees simply forget to call CMS to elect a di¤erent
plan during the open enrollment period.
All of these sources of switching costs will contribute to our estimate of the switching cost,
sc. Although policy makers may want to disentangle the sources, doing so is beyond the scope
of this paper, especially given that we work with aggregate market share data.
2.4 Forward-looking Consumers Problem
We assume that the Medicare beneciary is a forward-looking consumer who maximizes the
expected stream of utility ows with an e¤ort to minimize costs from possible switches. Let

t denote an information set that includes current product attributes fpjt;X0jtgj2Jmt and other
factors that inuence future product attributes. We assume 
t follows a Markov process.
Dening utility ow fj (
t)   pjt+X0jtx+jt; the Bellman equation of the forward-looking
consumer is given as
V (dit;
t; "it) = max
dit; j2Jmtnfditg
(
fdit(
t) + idit+ E [EV (dit;
t+1)j
t] ;
fj (
t) + ijt   sc+ E [EV (j;
t+1)j
t]
)
: (1)
where "it = [ijt] j2Jmtand EV (j;
t) =
Z
V (j;
t; "it)dP ("it).
Let cvj(
t)  fj (
t)+E [EV (j;
t+1)j
t] denote the choice specic value function of plan
j. Then, as in Rust (1987), the expected value function can be written as
8The doctors o¢ ce for one of this papers authors charges $15 per prescription faxed over to a new pharmacy.
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EV (dit;
t) = ln
24 X
j2Jmtnfditg
exp (cvj(
t)) + exp(cvdit(
t))
35+ ; (2)
where  = exp( sc) and  denotes Eulers constant, which we will omit for notational simplic-
ity.9
Let  d(
t)  ln(
P
j 6=d exp (cvj(
t))) so that exp( d(
t)) =
P
j 6=d exp (cvj(
t)) : This
value, which is similar to the logit inclusive value in Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009), is
monotonic in the sum of the choice specic values of the non-default plans. We call this value
the non-default option value. Now Equation (2) can be rewritten as
EV (dit;
t) = ln [ exp ( dit(
t)) + exp(cvdit(
t))] : (3)
The possible large dimensionality of the state variables 
t could make the DP problem almost
impossible to solve. To reduce the dimension of the state space, we make the following two
assumptions about the transition probabilities, P (fd(
t+1);  d(
t+1)j
t).
Assumption 1 If fd(
t) = 
f
d(

0
t) and  d(
t) =  d(

0
t); then P (
f
d(
t+1);  d(
t+1)jd;
t) =
P (fd(

0
t+1);  d(

0
t+1)jd;
0t) for all t; 
t; 
0t and for all d 2 Jmt.
In words, if two di¤erent information sets 
t and 
0t lead to the same mean utility ow
and non-default option value for plan d; then the joint distribution of the plans future mean
utility ow and non-default option value is the same. This implies that fd and  d have
all the information relevant to the evolution of the state variables in 
t, as in GR. Under this
assumption, we can reduce the state variables 
t into a pair (
f
d ;  d) and rewrite EV (d;
t) as
EV (d; fdt;  dt). As noted by GR, in principle, this assumption is restrictive. For example,
when fd and  d are high, it implies consumers expect 
f
d and  d to evolve in the same fashion
regardless of whether  d is high because there are many non-default products with low choice
specic values or because there are just a few non-default products with high choice specic
values. However, in our application, the number of plans and the distribution of their market
shares, which could be relevant omitted state variables, are quite stable over the sample period.
Assumption 2 If fdt = 
f
d0t and  dt =  d0t; then P (
f
dt+1;  dt+1jd; fdt;  dt) =
P (fd0t+1;  d0t+1jd0; fd0t;  d0t) for all t and d; d0 2 Jmt.
In words, if plan d and plan d0 have the same levels of mean utility ow and non-default
option value, then consumers expect the distributions of future values of the two variables to
9See Rust (1987) for proof.
10
be identical. This assumption further reduces the dimension of the state space from three to
two by assuring that the expected value function depends on the default plan d only through
the values of the two state variables, fd and  d. This assumption will not be appropriate
if plans exhibit systematic di¤erences in their dynamic behavior and consumers are aware of
these di¤erences. For example, there is concern if some plans tend to keep the mean utility
levels constant over time whereas the others steadily decrease them. This assumption is neither
necessary nor appropriate for many studies. In our application, it is useful because we need
to estimate transition probabilities using data with a large number of choices in each market
over a short sample period (4 years). Also, the Medicare Part D market is new; we believe no
insurer has established a reputation for consumers to expect plans to behave di¤erently from
one another.
Under the two assumptions, we can rewrite EV (d;
t) as EV (
f
dt;  dt) and cvd(
t) as
cv(fdt;  dt). Now the expected value function is given as
EV (fdt;  dt) = ln
h
 exp ( dt) + exp

cv(fdt;  dt)
i
; (4)
 dt  ln
X
j 6=d
exp

cv(fjt;  jt)

; (5)
cv(fjt;  jt) = 
f
jt +   EEV (fjt;  jt) 8 j 2 Jmt (6)
where EEV (fjt;  jt) = E
h
EV (fjt+1;  jt+1)
 fjt;  jti. Let ft = hfjti
j2Jmtnf0g
denote the
vector of mean utility ows of all products except the outside option. Note that the choice
specic value function cv(fjt;  jt) is ultimately a function of 
f
t , given the Markov transition
probability distribution, because the non-default option value  jt is an implicit function of 
f
t .
For notational simplicity, we let cvjt denote the choice specic value for plan j in time t.
Let sjt(d) denote the probability that a consumer whose default plan is d chooses to purchase
plan j in time t:When d 6= 0, the probability di¤ers depending on whether plan j is the default
plan or not:
sjt(d) =
exp( sc  1(j 6= d)) exp(cvjt)
 exp ( dt) + exp(cvdt)
(7)
The probability that a consumer whose default is the outside option purchases plan j is given
as
sjt(0) =
exp(cvjt)
exp ( 0t) + exp(cvi0)
:
With a positive switching cost, equation (7) shows the probability of choosing the default plan
is higher than the probability of choosing a non-default plan that has an identical choice specic
value. We want to emphasize that choice probabilities in a dynamic Logit model are functions
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of choice specic values whereas they are functions of mean utility ows in a static Logit model.
This implies that choice probabilities, as well as switching probabilities, can be computed using
only knowledge of products choice specic values fcvjtgj2Jmt. It is not necessary to know
how the choice specic values are decomposed into current mean utility ows and continuation
values.
To derive the aggregate market share expression, we need to account for the annual inux of
newly eligible Medicare beneciaries entering the market and outux exiting the market. Senior
citizens become eligible at age 65 and remain eligible for the rest of their lives. We assume they
exit the market upon death. Let Not denote the number of people who were eligible in t   1,
and Nnt; the number of people who became newly eligible in t.  is one minus the death rate
for the population over 65. Dene not =
Not
Not +Nnt
as the fraction of the Medicare population
eligible in t  1 who remain in the Medicare Part D market in year t.10
The market share of plan j in time t is
Mjt = not
JmtX
d=0
sjt(d)Mdt 1 + (1  not)sjt(0) (8)
The rst term is the probability that consumers who were eligible in period t  1 choose plan
j and the second term is the probability that newly eligible consumers in period t choose plan
j. Equation (8) shows that the current market share of plan j is determined by the distribu-
tion of lagged market shares of all plans fMdt 1gd2Jmt and all pairwise switching probabilities
fsjt(d)gd2Jmt. Note that Mj0 = sj0(0) where we let t = 0 denote the inception year of the
program, 2006.
3 Estimation Algorithm and Identication
We estimate the switching cost and ow utility parameters using a three-level nested xed
point algorithm. In the outer loop we minimize GMM objective functions based on moment
conditions that put restrictions on the serial correlation of unobserved product qualities. We
also include moment conditions that require observed product attributes and price instruments
be orthogonal to unobserved product qualities. The middle loop recovers unobserved product
qualities by inverting the non-linear system of market share equations into mean utility ows.
The inner loop solves the dynamic programming problem described by equation (4) through
(6).
10We do not account for under 65 individuals who are eligible for Medicare through disability. This omission
will not introduce bias if their exit rate from Medicare is similar to that of the over 65 Medicare eligibles.
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Our estimation algorithm is most similar to Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009) in that they
share the same outer and inner loop. The key di¤erence lies in the middle loop that recovers
mean utility ows. Our middle loop proceeds in two steps. The rst step recovers choice
specic values by numerically inverting the non-linear system of market shares equations in (8)
after substituting observed market shares for model-predicted ones. This step is the dynamic
counterpart of the inversion in Berry (1994). Because the market share equations are solely
functions of choice specic values, the rst step inversion can be performed without knowledge
of mean utility ows. The second step searches for the vector of mean utility ows that generate
the recovered choice specic values. Recall that the choice specic value function cv(fjt;  jt) is
an explicit function of the mean utility ow fjt and the non-default option value  jt: As the
latter is itself an implicit function of the vector of mean utility ows of all other alternatives,
the choice specic value function is a function of the vector of mean utility ows ft . We apply
a xed point algorithm to solve for ft in this step.
The method in Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009) skips the rst step of recovering (mean)
choice specic values. Instead, their method directly inverts out mean utility ows from the
market share equations by literally applying the BLP xed point algorithm to mean utility ows
(with a small modication to slow down the convergence process). For a non-random coe¢ cient
Logit model, we have found that our method performs signicantly better than theirs in terms
of convergence speed.11
3.1 Estimation Algorithm
First, we discretize the state space (fd ;  d) to solve the DP problem in the inner loop.
12 We
assume that the discount factor,  and the survivor rate, (1  ) are known.13
3.1.1 Outer Loop
The outer loop searches over the parameter space to satisfy the orthogonality conditionE(Z 0) =
0 where Z is a matrix of instrumental variables. The parameter estimate b is chosen to minimize
11For comparison, we ran the GR algorithm using one consumer type for various trial values of the switching
cost. Only 4 to 11 markets achieved convergence after around 800 to 900 iterations and most markets failed
to converge within the specied maximum of 1,500 middle loop iterations. Under our algorithm, most markets
achieved convergence within around 400 iterations and just a few required over 700 iterations. Only one market,
at one particular value of the switching cost, failed to converge within 1500 iterations.
12We descretize fd into 40 evenly-spaced grid points and  d into 60 evenly-space grid points.
13We do not explicitely model how the non-zero death rate enters the senior citizens dynamic programming
problem.
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the corresponding GMM sample criterion function. That is,
b=argmin
2
G(;
c
ft ; eX;Z)0WG(;cft ; eX;Z) (9)
where eX = fpj; Xjgj2Jmtnf0g;  = fsc;; xg, G(;cft ; eX;Z) = 1NZ 0(;cft ; eX;Z) is the sample
analog of the moment conditions, and W is a weight matrix.
We can concentrate out the linear parameters, and perform our numerical minimization
of the GMM criterion function over the switching cost parameter. For each trial value of the
switching cost, we obtain a vector of mean utility ows cft . As in Berry (1994) and Berry et al.
(1995), we obtain a vector of unobserved product qualities

jt

j2Jmtnf0g as the residual of IV
regression of cfjt on (pjt;Xjt).
To construct moment conditions, we consider two di¤erent cases: when the unobserved
product quality jt is serially independent, and when it is serially correlated. We instrument
for the premium as it is likely set in response to the unobserved demand shock jt. Our instru-
ments for the premium include lagged prices of the same plan in other regions. We maintain
the assumption that other observed product attributes are exogenous. We elaborate on instru-
mental variables and identication of the switching cost and linear preference parameters in
section 3.2.
Our algorithm begins with an initial guess of the switching cost. Let sck denote the k-th
trial value of the switching cost.
3.1.2 Middle Loop
First Step: For the given switching cost sck passed from the outer loop, the rst step of the
middle loop recovers the relative choice specic value for each product. Let cvjt  cvjt  cv0t
denote what we call product js relative choice specic value. At this step, we can only solve for
the Jmt relative choice specic values, cv1t; : : : ;cvJmtt, not the Jmt+1 choice specic values
because equation (8) only gives Jmt linearly independent market share equations. This follows
from the fact that s0t(d) = 1  
P
j 6=0 sjt(d), and can be seen by dividing the numerator and
denominator of the choice probability in the market share equation by cv0t :
sjt(d) =
exp( sc  1(j 6= d)) exp(cvjt   cv0t)
exp( sc)Pk 6=d exp (cvkt   cv0t) + exp(cvdt   cv0t)
 exp( sc  1(j 6= d)) exp(cvjt)
exp( sc)(1 +Pk 6=d;0 exp (cvkt)) + exp(cvdt) :
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Given a trial value of the switching cost sck and the shares of newly entering consumers f(1 
not)g, we substitute model predicted market shares in equation (8) with actual market shares,
and then solve for the vector of unknown relative choice specic values,cvt= [cvjt]j2Jmtnf0g.
Note that cvt is only determined by the value of the switching cost sc and observed market
sharesMt  [Mjt; Mjt 1]j2Jmtnf0g. Therefore, the value ofcvt is xed until a new trial value
of the switching cost is passed by the outer loop.
This step is the dynamic counterpart of the inversion in Berry (1994). Unlike the static
model in Berry (1994) that has an analytical solution, the inversion must be performed numer-
ically.14 However, it is not computationally expensive and can be implemented with standard
solver packages such as fsolve in Matlab.
Second Step: In the second step we recover Jmt values of mean utility ows 
f
t from the
Jmt functional values of cvt recovered in the rst step. Because the choice specic value
function cv(fjt;  jt) is an implicit function of 
f
t and 
f
0t (normalized to zero), this requires
another inversion of a function. We turn this into a xed point problem.
To illustrate the core idea of this step, consider a simplied model where we assume that
the function EEV (; ) is known. This is equivalent to assuming that the Markov transi-
tion probability distributions of fd and  d are known. Note that cv0t is a function of cvt
as shown in cv0t =   EEV (0; ln(
P
j 6=0 exp(cvjt + cv0t))). Lets suppose, with EEV (; )
known, we could invert the above expression to solve for cv0t and hence could compute  jt =
ln(
P
k 6=j exp(cvkt + cv0t)): Recall that cvt is solely determined by sc and observed market
sharesMt. Thus, cv0t and  jt are also functions of sc andMt. To emphasize this, we rewrite
them as cv0t(sc;Mt) and  jt(sc;Mt). Now we can solve for 
f
jt based on the denition of the
choice specic value function:
cvjt(sc;Mt) + cv0t(sc;Mt) = 
f
jt +   EEV

fjt;  jt(sc;Mt)

: (10)
Because fjt in equation (10) cannot be solved for analytically, we turn to a xed point algorithm.
Dene the operator eT (sc;Mt) : R Jmt ! R Jmt pointwise by
14The log-linearity exploited in the analytical Berry inversion does not hold with a positive switching cost
because a plans market share is derived from the sum of consumers switching into the plan from all other
plans. If the switching cost is zero, sjt(d) = sjt regardless of default d, and therefore equation (8) implies
Mjt = sjt. Also, E [EV (dit;
t+1)j
t] = E [EV (
t+1)j
t] as the default does not a¤ect future decisions.
These together lead to an analytical inversion
Mjt
M0t
=
sjt
s0t
= exp(cvjt   cv0t) = exp(fjt + E [EV (
t+1)j
t]  (0 + E [EV (
t+1)j
t])) = exp(fjt)
just as in Berry (1994).
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eT j(sc;Mt) hfjti = cvjt(sc;Mt) + cv0t(sc;Mt)    EEV fjt;  jt(sc;Mt) (11)
for j = 1; :::; Jmt: A xed point 
f
t of the operator eT solves equation (10). The operator eT is a
contraction mapping under some mild condition (see Appendix B for proof), and hence there
is a unique xed point.
In the above hypothetical scenario, we assume EEV (; ) is known and we can analytically
invert EEV (; ) to obtain cv0t. In reality, EEV (; ) is unknown because the parameters of
the transition probability distributions are unknown. We estimate them using ft . As such, the
second step nests the value function iteration. Thus, EEV (; ) is re-estimated every time ft
takes on di¤erent values. We also need to modify the xed point operator in equation (11)
because cv0t cannot be solved for analytically from EEV (; ).
Our second step begins by passing the initial guesses of cv0t(0) and 
f
t(0) to the inner loop.
Let EEV (n)(; ) denote the function that the inner loop returns after the n-th iteration of the
second step. Given EEV (n)(; ), the middle loops second step updates values for cv0t(n+1) and
fjt(n+1) using the operator T (sc;Mt)
h
cv0t(n); 
f
t(n)
i
: R Jmt+1 ! R Jmt+1 dened pointwise as
T 0(sc;Mt)

cv0t(n)

=   EEV (n)(0; ln(Pj 6=0 exp(cvjt + cv0t(n))));
T j(sc;Mt)
h
fjt(n)
i
= cvjt + T
0(sc;Mt)

cv0t(n)
    EEV (n)(fjt(n);  jt(n))
for j = 1; :::; Jmt. Because the inner loop works on a discretized state space, we need to compute
the continuation value EEV (n)(fjt(n);  jt(n)) for each j 2 Jmt using an interpolation technique
such as cubic splines. This operator T di¤ers from the one in equation (11) because it includes
the additional pointwise operator T 0 and because the function EEV (n) is not xed at each iter-
ation. In summary, updating cv0t(n+1), 
f
jt(n+1) and EEV
(n+1)(; ) proceeds in three sequential
steps. First, we apply the pointwise operator T 0 to update the value for cv0t(n+1). Second, we
substitute cv0t(n+1) into the pointwise operators T j to update the values for 
f
jt(n+1):
15 Third, we
pass cv0t(n+1) and 
f
jt(n+1) to the inner loop to update EEV
(n+1)(; ). The loop continues until
errn = max
j2Jmtnf0g
ncv0t(n+1)   cv0t(n) ; fjt(n+1)   fjt(n)o <  where  is a pre-specied criterion
for convergence.16
15In early iterations (up to 200 iterations), we set cv0t(n+1) = T 0
h
cv0t(n); 
f
t(n)
i
and fjt(n+1) =
T j
h
cv0t(n); 
f
t(n)
i
. For later iterations, we set cv0t(n+1) = :2 cv0t(n)+ :8 T 0
h
cv0t(n); 
f
t(n)
i
and fjt(n+1) =
:2 fjt(n) + :8T
j
h
cv0t(n); 
f
t(n)
i
to stabilize the algorithm. For quite a few markets and many switching cost
values, the middle loop converged with less than 200 iterations.
16We tested with  = 1e  09 and  = 1e  06. The di¤erence in the resulting vectors is within the precision.
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Unlike the operator eT in equation (11), we cannot prove that T (sc;Mt) hcv0t(n); ft(n)i is
contractive and hence cannot prove there is a unique xed point. We use many starting values
of cv0t(0) and 
f
t(0) , and nd that uniqueness is not a problem in practice. When the switching
cost is greater than 4, the operator converges to the same vector of ft for all markets and for
all starting values. When the switching cost is less than 4, uniqueness fails in at most one
or two markets. Uniqueness does not hold for the alternative model where consumers whose
default option is the outside option also pay the switching cost to enroll in a plan. The lack of
uniqueness is the technical reason for not using this alternative model.
3.1.3 Inner Loop
The inner loop takes values of cv0t(n) and 
f
t(n) passed from the middle loop and computes
 jt(n) = ln
X
k 6=j
exp([cvjt + cv0t(n))

for each j 2 Jmt. Then it solves the dynamic pro-
gramming problem to nd a xed point of the expected value function in equation (4) and
returns those functional values, EEV (n)(; ); back to the middle loop.
To solve the DP problem, it necessary to estimate the Markov transition probability distri-
butions for the two state variables fjt and  jt. We make the following simplifying assumption
on the transition probabilities:
P (fjt+1;  jt+1 j fjt;  jt) = Pr(fjt+1 j fjt)  Pr( jt+1 j  jt): (12)
This assumption states that the two state variables evolve independently. It implies the
consumer believes that the ow utility the plan is expected to deliver in the next period does
not depend on the value of other plans as embodied in  jt. This is a restrictive assumption in
general, but is innocuous if fjt is set by the insurer in response to other plans values embodied in
 jt: In such case, conditioning on 
f
jt 1 will not bring in extra information about the evolution
of fjt.
We further assume that each state variable follows an AR(1) process as follows:
fjt = 11m + 12m
f
jt 1 + jmt; jmt  (0; 21m); (13)
 jt = 21m + 22m jt 1 + ejmt; ejmt  (0; 22m):
For the outside option, we assume Prob (f0t+1 = 0
f0t = 0) = 1. The above specication
implies consumers on average correctly forecast the future. As mentioned earlier, we do not
model the exit of a plan as a discrete event because there are very few exits observed in the data.
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Estimates of the probability of exit based on the frequency will not be reliable. Instead, we
include exiting plans as observations of which mean utility ows fall to zero when we estimate
the above AR(1) equation, which allows for Prob (fjt+1 = 0
fjt 6= 0) 6= 0.
Let P (n)(x0; y0 j x; y) denotes the transition probability distribution we estimate using ft(n)
and f jt(n)g. Given P (n), we solve for EV (n)(; ) in equation (14) through contraction mapping
to obtain EEV (n)(; ) = R EV (n)(x0; y0)  dP (n)(x0; y0 j x; y).
EV (n)(x; y) = ln

 exp (y) + exp

x+ 
Z
EV (n)(x0; y0)  dP (n)(x0; y0 j x; y)

: (14)
3.2 Identication and Instruments
Identication of switching costs using only aggregate market share data is a subtle matter. In
this section, we describe how our moment conditions identify switching costs jointly with other
demand parameters. We consider two cases. The rst case assumes the unobserved product
qualities jt are serially independent under the true data generating process (DGP). The second
case allows jt to be serially correlated. For each case, we use distinct moment conditions.
Conceptually, the switching cost is identied through persistency in the distribution of
market shares. However, market share persistency can also be generated by persistency in
observed product characteristics and unobserved product qualities. To illustrate this point,
rst consider an example of non-identication. Suppose there are three alternatives available
in period 0 and period 1. The rst alternatives market share is 50% while each of the remaining
alternatives has a market share of 25% in period 0. Assume that all three alternativesmarket
shares do not change over time and their observed product characteristics and premiums do not
change. Without variation in product characteristics and market shares across time, switching
costs are not identied. One cannot tell whether the rst alternative remains popular in period
1 because of a high switching cost that prevents people from switching away or because its
observed product characteristics and/or unobserved product quality remain desirable. Now
lets modify the example so that there is variation in observed product characteristics across
time. For example, suppose the rst and second plans observed product characteristics and
premiums ip with each other in period 1. In this case, the persistent high market shares
of product 1 cannot be explained by persistency in its observed product characteristics and
premium. Instead it can be attributed to either a high switching cost or serial correlation of
unobserved quality 10 and 11. If the unobservable is known to be serially independent, we
may exclude the latter explanation.
For the case of serially independent jt, we identify the switching cost o¤ the fact that
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remaining across-time variation in ow utilities, after netting out the e¤ect of across-time vari-
ation in product characteristics and premiums, is serially independent. Consider the mechanics
of the estimation algorithm. For any given trial value of the switching cost parameter, the
middle loop returns a vector of ow utilities fj0; 
f
j1; ::: for each product that is consistent with
the observed persistency in market shares. The vector of ow utilities will di¤er at di¤erent
values of the switching cost parameter. Therefore, across-time variation in observed product
characteristics and premiums (Xj0; Xj1; :::) and (pj0; pj1; :::) will generate a di¤erent level of
persistency in the unobserved product quality remainder terms, j0; j1; :::, at each switching
cost value. At the true switching cost and linear preference parameters, the vector of recovered
ow utilities must preserve the serial independence of jt.
Thus, we base our moment condition on the serial independence condition, E(jt 1jt) = 0.
Because jt 1 is unobserved, we use lagged premium, pjt 1, as an instrument for jt 1:E(pjt 1jt) =
0. Note that lagged premium is orthogonal to jt because jt is not in the insurers information
set when making pricing decisions in period t  1, but it is correlated with jt 1 because insur-
ers set prices in response to contemporaneous demand shocks. We also impose orthogonality
between lagged values of product characteristics Xjt 1 and jt, so that across-time variation in
product characteristics can help identify the switching cost parameter.
As in static models, we use contemporaneous values of the exogenous product characteristics
Xjt as instruments for themselves to identify the x coe¢ cients. For the endogenous premium
coe¢ cient, , we use a lagged Hausmann instrument Hjmt 1: average prices of the same plan
in other markets which are intended to reect common cost shocks across markets. However, if
the Hausmann instrument also picks up common demand shocks, contemporaneous Hjmt is not
a valid instrument. Even so, the lagged Hausmann instrument can be valid. This is because
yesterdays demand shock in market m0, reected in Hjmt 1, is uncorrelated with todays shock
in market m by the serial independence assumption. As cost shocks have long lasting e¤ects
through labor contracts and other business commitments such as contracts with pharmaceutical
manufacturers in our case, the lagged value of a variable that captures common cost shocks is
expected to be correlated with the current price.
In summary we use the following moment conditions for the case of serially independent
unobserved product qualities.
E(Z 0jtjt) = 0 where Zjt = [pjt 1;Xjt 1; Hjt 1;Xjt] (15)
We consider another case where the unobserved qualities jt are serially correlated under
the true DGP. In this case, across-time variation or persistency in recovered ow utilities can
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be explained by across-time variation in observable product attributes and serial correlation in
the unobserved product qualities. The above moment conditions are no longer valid. Because
E(jt 1jt) 6= 0 in this environment, insurers will set prices today in expectation of future
demand shocks, thus E(pjt 1jt) = 0 does not hold.
To sort out the e¤ect of serial correlation in the unobservable on (across-time variation or
persistency in) ow utilities, one needs information about the way jt is serially correlated. We
assume that jt follows an AR1 process with corr(jmt 1; jmt) = corr(
f
jmt 1; 
f
jmt) = 12m: This
assumption leads to the condition that the resulting white noise jt+1 should be uncorrelated
with jt at the true parameter values. Thus, we identify the switching cost o¤ the assumption
that the remaining across-time variation in ow utilities, after netting out the e¤ect of across-
time variation in product attributes and serial correlation of jt, is due to purely temporary
demand shocks that are orthogonal to lagged unobserved product qualities.
As in the serially independent case, we use contemporaneous values of the exogenous product
characteristics Xjt as instruments for themselves to identify the linear preference parameters
x. For the endogenous premium coe¢ cient, we use the lagged Hausmann instrument.
In summary we use the following moment conditions for the case of serially correlated
unobserved product qualities.
E( eZ 0jtjt) = 0 where eZjt = [jt+1; Hjt 1;Xjt] (16)
Comparing the two cases, there are trade-o¤s in the identication strategy. The rst case
imposes the strong restriction that unobservable plan qualities are serially independent. But it
has the advantage of using robust instruments. Lagged premium is a robust instrument because
it is based on a weak exogeneity assumption that future demand shocks are not in the insurers
current information set. Also note that in some specications, we include insurer and market
xed e¤ects in Xjt which makes it more plausible that the residual error jt represents serially
independent demand shocks. The second case imposes a weaker restriction that allows unob-
servable plan qualities to be serially correlated. But it has the disadvantage of using less robust
instruments based on the assumption that corr(fjmt 1; 
f
jmt) = corr(jmt 1; jmt) = 12m. The
temporary demand shocks used to identify the switching cost come from the inner loop AR1
regression, which may be misspecied due to its simple parametric form. Misspecication is a
particular concern when the assumption about the independence of the two state variables (as
stated in equation (12)) is thought to be restrictive.
When data on switching frequencies are available, one can instead impose a micro moment
condition on the switching probability predicted by the model. For example, the CMS press
release on January 31, 2008 revealed that 12% of enrollees switched their plans between 2007
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and 2008. To compute the average switching probability, one only needs to know choice specic
values relative to the value of the outside option cvt(sc). This implies we can pin down the
value of the switching cost, bsc, by setting the predicted average switching probability in 2008
equal to 12%. Then we would search for the xed point ft that is consistent with the given
cvt(bsc) and obtain estimates of linear coe¢ cients on product characteristics that minimize
a GMM objective function. We do not estimate our model using this idea. Instead we use
this extra information to see whether the switching cost parameter estimated using the above
moment conditions can produce switching probabilities similar to the actual one.
4 Data
We collected publicly available data from CMS. The data include the monthly premium, enroll-
ment, and benet type (basic or enhanced) for all plans o¤ered since the inception of Part D in
2006 through 2009. They also publish statistics on the number of people eligible for Medicare.
Across all years there is an average of 42 million eligible Medicare beneciaries.
We also purchased detailed data on plan characteristics from CMS. There are four les.
The formulary le lists all drugs on a plans formulary, the beneciary cost le describes
copay/coinsurance cost sharing rates, the pharmacy network le lists all preferred and non-
preferred pharmacies, and the pricing le reports average drug transaction prices for every
drug and plan. The pricing le was rst published in 2009, the other les are available in all
years. Weve converted all dollar values into real terms, expressed in 2006 dollars.
4.1 Market Shares and Premiums
Across the four years, 102 insurers o¤er stand-alone Part D plans. The average insurer o¤ers
plans in 9 of the 39 regions in the US and its territories. We use only the 34 regions in the
continental US for estimation. The size distribution of insurers is quite skewed: each year an
average of 10 insurers o¤er plans in all 34 regions, while about a half o¤er plans in just one
region. Consumers have many plans to choose from. The average region includes 48 plans
o¤ered by 21 insurers. Insurers typically o¤er 1, 2, or 3 plans in each region. At least one must
be a basic plan. Table 8 shows the average number of insurers and plan o¤erings per market
over the sample period. The number of plans tended to increase in the rst three years until it
fell in 2009. Basic plans outnumbered enhanced plans in a typical market until 2007.
Table 9 presents the average monthly premium in 2006 dollars for each year during the
sample period. The premium averages $38.2 across regions and years. These premium gures
are net of subsidies. The average monthly premium fell in the second year, but experienced
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a moderate increase in 2008 and a 15% increase in 2009. The large variance in the monthly
premium is largely due to the presence of two segments in the benet structure; the average
monthly premium for basic plans is $30.0 with a standard deviation of $9.6, and it is $46.6
with a standard deviation of $18.7 for enhanced plans. The second panel in Table 9 reports
the market share weighted average premium across the 34 regions for each year. The mean
increased gradually, from $26.88 to $32.48, over the sample period. The fact that the weighted
average premium is lower than the simple average premium implies that more popular plans
charge lower monthly premiums than less popular plans. It is interesting that the market
share weighted premium rose in 2007, yet the non-weighted average premium fell. One possible
interpretation is that many enrollees remained in their default plans even though they were
faced with premium increases.
The rst panel in Table 10 reports statistics on market-level enrollment rates in stand-alone
Part D plans as a percentage of all Medicare eligible beneciaries. The average enrollment rate
is 34.4% in all years. Some markets have a low enrollment rate around 18% and the maximum
ranges from 55% to 59%. The second panel reports national-level enrollment rates. National
enrollment in stand-alone Part D plans remained stagnant across years. CMS reports about
90% of Medicare beneciaries have drug coverage from a stand-alone Part D plan or another
source. Along with non-enrollment, these other sources compose the outside option in our
model and include bundled MA+Part D plans, RDS plans, and plans from other government
programs. The nal column in the table indicates enrollment in MA+Part D has increased
over the years.
Table 11 reports summary statistics on plan-level market shares. An average plans market
share is around 0.77%. This small gure is consistent with a market level enrollment rate of
38% and a large number of plans in an average market, 48. Markets shares are quite skewed.
The market share of the most popular plan in a region averages 7.6% across markets and years.
Some garner particularly high market shares of around 16%. At the insurer level, United
Healthcare is the market leader, capturing around 18.26% of enrollees. It o¤ers a plan named
AARP MedicareRx Preferred, which is the market leader in 24 markets on average over the
four year period. Humana Insurance Company is a close runner-up with an 18.24% share of
national enrollment, although its plans are market leaders in only 4 markets on average.
Some plans leave the market overtime. We supplement the enrollment data with informa-
tion in the Crosswalkdata le to identify whether these plans were consolidated with another
plan or were truly terminated. When a plan consolidates into another plan, enrollees are auto-
matically transferred to the other plan. This requires a slight modication to the computation
of the past markets shares of consolidating plans. For example, if plan k is consolidated into
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plan j in year t, fMjt 1 = Mjt 1 +Mkt 1 and we use fMjt 1 as the endowed past market share
that determines the number of consumers whose default option is plan j.17
Some plans, though not many, truly exit the market. If a plan exits the market in year
t, its enrollees from year t   1 are not automatically enrolled in another plan. To obtain
coverage, those enrollees would have to actively choose and purchase another plan. Therefore,
we designate their default option to be the outside option. This requires a modication to the
lagged market share of the outside option: fM0t 1 = 1 X
j2Jmtnf0g
fMjt 1.18 Table 12 presents
the number of terminated plans and their average market shares for each year. As shown, exits
do not occur frequently, and exiting plans usually have market shares much smaller than the
market average.
To estimate the survivor rate (1  ), we use the number of deaths and the death rates among
the population over age 65 in 2006 published by the Center for Disease Control (CDC).19 The
estimated survivor rate (1  ) is 95.3%.
4.2 Plan Characteristics
We follow the cost sharing structure laid out in the Part D regulations to construct variables that
measure the generosity of planscoverage. The regulations set a minimum coverage standard.
Figure 1 depicts this basic benet structure. It describes the out-of-pocket price an enrollee pays
to ll a prescription as a function of the enrollees annual drug expenditures. The price schedule
can be thought of as a ve part tari¤. The rst region is the premium; it is paid regardless of
drug expenditures. Next, an enrollee pays 100% of drug expenditures out of pocket until he
reaches the deductible threshold ($250 in 2006). For the next $2,000 of expenditures, coverage
begins, and the enroll pays 25% out of pocket. This is called the initial coverage region. After
that, coverage ends, and the enrollee pays 100% of expenditures. This is the so-called donut
hole region. Finally, for very high expenditures above $5,100, coverage resumes with an out-of-
pocket price of just 5%. This is called catastrophic coverage. Medicare categorizes plans that
meet (or are actuarially equivalent to) the minimum standard as basic plans. Enhanced plans
typically o¤er some combination of a lower deductible, lower out-of-pocket costs in the initial
coverage zone, or added coverage in the donut hole.
The regulations give plans a lot of scope in selecting what drugs to include on their drug
17We also incorporate this crosswalk information in estimation of the transition probabilities of the two state
variables. Continuing with the example, the consolidation event will give two separate observations, (fjt 1; 
f
jt)
and (fkt 1; 
f
jt), to be included in the estimation of the transition probability distribution of the utility ow.
18When plan l exits the market, it generates observations of (flt 1; 0) and ( lt 1;  0t) to be included in the
estimation of the transition probability distributions of the two state variables.
19CDC statistics retrieved from http://www.disastercenter.com/cdc/Table_3_2006.html.
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formularies and in setting copay/coinsurance rates and usage restrictions on a drug-by-drug
basis. This exibility is intended to give plans leverage in negotiating discounts and rebates with
drug manufacturers and wholesalers. The regulations require plans to include some drugs from
all of the major therapeutic classes, but plans have the discretion to choose exactly which drugs
to include. Indeed, some plans o¤er almost the entire universe of Part D drugs, and some restrict
the set of covered drugs.20 For each drug on the formulary, plans can set usage restrictions in the
form of quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapies. Plans set copay/coinsurance
rates by placing drugs on pricing tiers such as preferred,non-preferred,and specialty.
Higher tiered drugs have higher copay/coinsurance rates. To meet the basic benet structure,
Medicare must approve the cost sharing rules as being actuarially equivalent.Despite this
requirement, idiosyncratic di¤erences in cost sharing rules and negotiated drug prices create a
lot of variation at the aggregate level, particularly amongst the most popular drugs.
We construct three plan-level variables to measure the generosity of coverage using the
detailed drug-level information purchased from CMS on formularies, copay/coinsurance rates,
and drug prices. The rst variable is the deductible. The regulations set the maximum annual
deductible to $250 in 2006 and it rose to $295 (nominal) in 2009. Table 15 reports summary
statistics.
The second and third coverage characteristics are intended to measure coverage generosity
in the initial coverage zone and donut hole. For each zone, we construct price indices of out-
of-pocket prices paid by enrollees for the top 100 most popular drugs ranked by prescriptions
lled. The rst price index measures the out-of-pocket cost for an enrollee to ll a 30 day
supply for a basket of the 100 drugs when he is in the initial coverage zone. The second index
measures out-of-pocket costs in the donut hole. The basket of drugs evenly weight each drug
(1/100th).
Table 13 reports summary statistics on the number of top 100 drugs included on formularies.
The average plan covers about 90 of the 100 drugs. In later years, plans have included slightly
fewer drugs on average, and the standard deviation has increased. This may indicate plans are
becoming more di¤erentiated with respect to formulary coverage. The table also reports the
number of unique formularies. There are fewer formularies than plans because insurers often
share formularies across their plan o¤erings.
Constructing out-of-pocket costs is straightforward for drugs covered by copay; the copay is
directly available in the beneciary cost le. For drugs covered by coinsurance, it is necessary
20Medicares formulary review board determines the set of drugs that are considered Part D drugs and
classies them into therapeutic categories. Some drugs, such as prescription sleep aids, are not considered Part
D drugs. Plans may include non-Part D drugs, but then the plan is classied as enhanced and the cost of
o¤ering additional drugs is not subsidized.
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to know the negotiated price of the drug. We use the 2009 pricing le. For drugs excluded
from the formulary, enrollees do not receive coverage; therefore, the out-of-pocket cost is the
full retail price.21 We set the retail price to the average price in the region.22 In summary, there
are three sources of variation underlying the price indices: copay/coinsurance rates, negotiated
drug prices, and formulary comprehensiveness. Table 14 reports summary statistics on the
out-of-pocket price index variables. Average prices are higher in the donut hole because many
basic plans o¤er zero coverage. There is a lot of variation across plans, particularly in the initial
coverage zone. Much of the variation stems from variation in formulary comprehensiveness.
Pharmacy networks introduce another dimension of horizontal product di¤erentiation. Our
nal plan characteristic (pharm per eligible) measures the number of network pharmacies per
eligible Medicare beneciary in a plans region. Table 15 reports summary statistics.
To capture any additional coverage benets for enhanced plans that are not captured by
the above variables, we include a dummy variable (BenetEA dummy) that takes on the value
1 if the plan is an enhanced plan. An example of an additional benet could be the inclusion
of a non-Part D drug. Table 16 presents summary statistics on this variable in the rst panel.
This variable is also important because enhanced plans are not eligible for auto-enrolled LIS
beneciaries. While the share of enhanced plans was less than 50% in the rst year of the
program, it increases over the sample period and becomes the dominant type of plan in all 34
markets in 2009.
We include another dummy variable (LIS dummy) that takes on the value 1 if the plan is
eligible to receive auto-enrolled LIS beneciaries. This variable is possibly endogenous because
only basic plans with a price set below a threshold (unknown a priori) become eligible. Ac-
cording to table 16, 29 percent of plans were LIS-eligible in 2006. This gure increases to 36%
in 2007, but then drops such that only 18% of plans are LIS-eligible in 2009. Since our market
shares include automatically assigned enrollees, we expect the coe¢ cient on this dummy to be
economically and statistically signicant.
Table 17 presents summary statistics on year-to-year changes in these covariates. The
variation in these changes is large. While the monthly premium on average increases by $3
every year, the standard deviation of the changes is $11. On the extremes, there is a plan that
experienced a premium decrease of $50 and another plan that experienced an increase of $75.
The out-of-pocket drug price indices decline on average, but many plans experienced a sharp
21To ll a prescription for an o¤-formulary drug, an enrollee would have to purchase it on his own or in some
cases the enrollee may be able to go through an appeals process with the insurance company.
22We use the average national price in rare cases where a region price does not exists. For the years 2006 to
2008 we construct the price indices in the same manner using 2009 prices. For plans that did not exists in 2009,
we use average regional prices. Drug prices, coinsurance rates, and copays di¤er across preferred, non-preferred,
and mail order pharmacies. All of our calculations are based on preferred pharmacies.
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increase. For most variables, the standard deviation of year-to-year changes is larger than the
average. This across-time variation is important for identifying the switching cost parameter in
our model because changes in plan characteristics are a driving force in an enrollees decision
to switch plans.
Table 18 presents estimation results of AR(1) processes for each product characteristic.
Based on the AR(1) coe¢ cient estimates, the process is stationary for all variables. The
goodness of t for the AR(1) models, measure by R2, is reasonably high, yielding R2 of 0.6 to
0.8 for most variables.
4.3 Preliminary Analysis
Before estimating the dynamic model, we present reduced form evidence that documents per-
sistence in the market share data. Table 1 reports estimates from various OLS regressions of
log market shares on product attributes. In 2006, all enrollees were new to the Part D program
and were not locked-in to a default plan. All consumers who decided to enroll would choose
a plan that o¤ers the highest expected value of utility ows. However in subsequent years,
once consumers became locked-in, switching costs make it disadvantageous to enroll in any
plan besides the default plan. Consumers would only switch to another plan if the expected
value of utility ows is high enough to justify the switching cost. Therefore, if premiums and
product characteristics change across years, static demand estimates should appear as if peo-
ple were less sensitive to premiums and plan characteristics in 2007-2009 than the initial year
2006. Comparing the coe¢ cients on premium in the rst two columns of table 1 indicates
that consumers appeared more price sensitive in 2006 than the later years. Although this is
not a¢ rmative evidence that there are switching frictions in the market, it shows that the
environment consumers faced in 2006 di¤ers from that in later years.
We then examine how much a plans current market share is a¤ected by the past market
share by regressing a plans market share on its lagged market share and demand controls. If
there exists a cost associated with switching plans, the data will exhibit strong dependence of
present market shares on past market shares. We report the results in the last three columns.
Our results show a large positive impact of lagged market shares on current market shares. The
e¤ect diminishes, but is not eliminated, when we add insurer and plan xed e¤ects. Because
the xed e¤ects, particularly plan xed e¤ects, help control for serially correlated unobserved
product qualities, these results suggest that the state dependence in demand is likely struc-
tural (caused by switching frictions) rather than spurious (an artifact of serially correlated
unobservables).
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Table 1: Preliminary OLS Regression Results
sample period 2006 2007-9 2007-9 2007-9 2007-9
lagged log share .7251* .6069* .3307*
(.0055) (.0066) (.0141)
Premium -.0606* -.0256* -.0219* -.0216* -.0164*
(.0041) (.0021) (.0009) (.0010) (.0012)
Deductible/12 -.0143* -.0461* -.0056* -.0055* .0037
(.0050) (.0033) (.0015) (.0015) (.0036)
BenetEA dummy .5428* -.2206* .2693* .2488* -.0299*
(.1008) (.0752) (.0317) (.0307) (.0437)
Initial coverage PI -.0112* -.0436* -.0068* -.0229* -.0199*
(.0047) (.0024) (.0010) (.0017) (.0016)
Donut Hole PI -.0899* .0036 -.0339* -.0226* -.0394*
(.0078) (.0066) (.0029) (.0033) (.0052)
pharm per eligible (1000) .7771* 1.4064* .1589* .2542* -1.0432*
(.1743) (.1218) (.0536) (.0510) (.2758)
LIS dummy 2.3470* 1.8981* 1.0587* 1.2867* .9144*
(.1194) (.0721) (.0315) (.0303) (.0321)
Insurer FE N N N Y N
Plan FE N N N N Y
N obs 1415 5139 4270a) 4270 2889b)
Adjusted R2 0.5101 0.2769 0.8700 0.8982 0.9450
a): Only plans with lagged market shares are included. b): Only plans that existed for the whole
sample period (2006-2009) are included.
5 Estimation Results
In this section, we present the estimation results. Table 2 reports the estimates of the switching
cost and coe¢ cients on product attributes based on the moment conditions for the case of
serially independent unobserved product qualities. We consider 6 specications that di¤er with
respect to the inclusion of insurer and region xed e¤ects as well as instrumenting strategies for
the LIS dummy variable. Specications group I includes the BenetEA dummy as a demand
control whereas group II uses it as an instrument for the LIS dummy.23
Across the 6 dynamic model specications, the switching cost estimate ranges from 6.43
to 7.17. These switching cost levels predict an average switching probability that ranges from
6.2% to 7.9%. The switching cost expressed in dollar terms (converted using the premium
coe¢ cient) ranges from $2,366 to $2,697.
23The LIS dummy is potentially endogenous because a plans LIS status is determined by the plans premium
relative to a weighted average of other planspremiums. The BenetEA dummy can serve as an instrument
for the LIS dummy because enhanced plans are not LIS eligible regardless of the premium set by insurers.
The BenetEA dummy variable may be excluded from the demand equation because other demand controls
(deductibles, donut hole prices, etc) already control for the di¤erence between enhanced and basic plans.
27
T
ab
le
2:
C
as
e
A
:
Se
ri
al
ly
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
U
no
bs
er
ve
d
Q
ua
lit
ie
s
Sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
I-
1
I-
2
I-
3
II
-1
a
)
II
-2
II
-3
St
at
ic
II
-3
A
lt
II
-3
Sw
it
ch
in
g
C
os
t
(S
C
)
7.
00
*
6.
43
*
6.
41
*
7.
17
*
6.
54
*
6.
51
*
3.
75
*
(0
.1
38
9)
(0
.1
32
4)
(0
.1
32
6)
(0
.1
67
3)
(0
.1
47
6)
(0
.1
47
2)
(0
.2
01
5)
D
ol
la
r
V
al
ue
of
SC
$2
36
6
$2
65
1
$2
47
3
$2
53
8
$2
69
7
$2
46
4
$1
48
5
A
ve
.
Sw
it
ch
in
g
P
ro
b.
6.
23
%
7.
83
%
7.
90
%
5.
86
%
7.
47
%
7.
57
%
40
.3
5%
P
re
m
iu
m
-0
.0
35
5*
-0
.0
29
1*
-0
.0
31
1*
-0
.0
33
9*
-0
.0
29
1*
-0
.0
31
7*
-0
.0
47
6*
-0
.0
30
3*
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
02
0)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
02
0)
(0
.0
02
7)
(0
.0
02
3)
D
ed
uc
ti
bl
e/
12
-0
.0
24
6*
-0
.0
16
1*
-0
.0
16
4*
-0
.0
17
1*
-0
.0
11
9*
-0
.0
11
6*
-0
.0
35
4*
-0
.0
19
4*
(0
.0
02
0)
(0
.0
02
0)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
02
5)
(0
.0
02
3)
(0
.0
02
3)
(0
.0
03
2)
(0
.0
02
7)
B
en
e
tE
A
du
m
m
y
0.
39
84
*
0.
24
22
*
0.
22
32
*
(0
.0
47
3)
(0
.0
41
7)
(0
.0
40
9)
In
it
ia
l
co
ve
ra
ge
P
I
-0
.0
16
0*
-0
.0
12
0*
-0
.0
12
2*
-0
.0
10
7*
-0
.0
09
3*
-0
.0
09
7*
-0
.0
42
6*
-0
.0
02
1
(0
.0
01
4)
(0
.0
01
8)
(0
.0
01
8)
(0
.0
01
7)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
02
3)
(0
.0
02
2)
D
on
ut
H
ol
e
P
I
-0
.0
48
0*
-0
.0
37
5*
-0
.0
40
1*
-0
.0
55
6*
-0
.0
39
3*
-0
.0
42
8*
-0
.0
48
7*
-0
.0
33
6*
(0
.0
04
9)
(0
.0
04
3)
(0
.0
04
2)
(0
.0
04
9)
(0
.0
04
4)
(0
.0
04
4)
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
05
3)
ph
ar
m
p
er
el
ig
ib
le
(
10
00
)
1.
02
12
*
0.
88
87
*
0.
69
82
*
1.
16
03
*
0.
94
76
*
0.
84
99
*
0.
55
71
*
1.
22
80
*
(0
.0
65
6)
(0
.0
64
3)
(0
.1
47
4)
(0
.0
81
6)
(0
.0
66
2)
(0
.1
61
9)
(0
.1
91
3)
(0
.1
83
7)
L
IS
du
m
m
y
1.
62
02
*
1.
68
30
*
1.
62
26
*
0.
82
10
*
1.
14
38
*
1.
06
88
*
2.
35
62
*
1.
52
80
*
(0
.0
47
6)
(0
.0
43
4)
(0
.0
44
5)
(0
.0
83
2)
(0
.0
71
7)
(0
.0
74
2)
(0
.1
00
4)
(0
.1
02
3)
In
su
re
r
F
E
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
R
eg
io
n
F
E
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
a)
:
Sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
2
us
es
th
e
B
en
e
tE
A
du
m
m
y
as
an
in
st
ru
m
en
t
fo
r
L
IS
.
If
pl
an
j
in
p
er
io
d
t
di
d
no
t
ex
is
t
in
t
 
1
or
if
t
=
2
0
0
6,
p
jt
 1
,
x
jt
 1
,
an
d
H
jt
 1
ar
e
se
t
to
b
e
ze
ro
.
28
Table 3: Case B: Serially Correlated Unobserved Qualities
Specication I-1 I-2 I-3 II-1a) II-2 II-3
Switching Cost (SC) 6.95* 6.15* 6.12* 7.01* 6.18* 6.15*
(0.2464) (0.3120) (0.3154) (0.2672) (0.3265) (0.3303)
Dollar Value of SC $1283 $1488 $1684 $1135 $1498 $1689
Ave. Switching Prob. 6.34% 8.89% 9.02% 6.21% 8.77% 8.89%
Premium -0.0650* -0.0496* -0.0436* -0.0741* -0.0495* -0.0437*
(0.0083) (0.0238) (0.0231) (0.0092) (0.0240) (0.0231)
Deductible/12 -0.0246* -0.0282* -0.0256* -0.0134* -0.0235* -0.0223*
(0.0027) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0040) (0.0062) (0.0059)
BenetEA dummy 0.3744* 0.1327* 0.0972
(0.0605) (0.0620) (0.0564)
Initial coverage PI -0.0101* -0.0058* -0.0052 -0.0132* -0.0055 -0.0050
(0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0028)
Donut Hole PI -0.1009* -0.0766 -0.0673 -0.1141* -0.0769* -0.0679*
(0.0137) (0.0366) (0.0356) (0.0150) (0.0370) (0.0358)
pharm per eligible (1000) 1.1803* 1.0797* 1.0487* 1.3431* 1.1206* 1.1231*
(0.0995) (0.1656) (0.2717) (0.1114) (0.1792) (0.2983)
LIS dummy 1.2691* 1.5617* 1.5327* 0.2474 1.2190* 1.2782*
(0.0998) (0.1417) (0.1549) (0.1864) (0.2571) (0.2509)
Insurer FE N Y Y N N Y
Region FE N N Y N Y Y
a): Specication II uses the BenetEA dummy as an instrument for LIS.
If plan j in period t did not exist in t  1, Hjt 1 is set to be zero. If plan j in period t exited the
market in t+ 1, t+1 is set to be zero. All 2009 plans are excluded.
Table 3 reports the parameter estimates based on the moment conditions for the case of
serially correlated unobserved qualities. The switching cost estimate ranges from 6.12 to 7.01,
slightly lower than the range found for the serially independent case. The implied switching
probability varies between 6.2% and 9.0%, which is higher than the serially independent case.
The switching cost expressed in dollar terms (converted using the premium coe¢ cient) ranges
between $1,135 and $1,689, which is much lower than the previous case. The dollar values
are lower primarily because the premium coe¢ cient is larger in magnitude, ranging between
-0.044 and -0.074, as opposed to a range of -0.029 to -0.036 for the serially independent case.
The intuition behind the di¤erent switching cost estimates found for the two cases follows from
the identifying assumptions. In the serially independent case, the model attributes all of the
persistency in market shares that remains after accounting for persistency in observables to
switching costs, whereas the serially correlated case attributes some of the persistency to the
serial correlation of unobserved plan qualities, which tends to lower the switching cost estimate.
The switching cost estimates are large and economically signicant regardless of which case
represents the true data generating process. It is useful to put the dollar-valued switching cost
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into perspective. According to a 2007 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MEDPAC)
report, the average annual prescription drug spending per enrollee was $2,790 and the average
out-of-pocket drug spending was $467.24 The average annual premium was $426. Based on the
estimation results from the serially correlated case, the dollar-valued switching cost estimates
are around 40% to 60% of the annual drug spending per enrollee and around 130% to 190% of
the average total Part D spending (out-of-pocket drug spending plus premiums).
Our results are more or less consistent with previous studies on health care plans. Handel
(2010) estimates switching costs amongst employer-provided health plans using individual-
level data. The average switching cost is estimated around $2,000, which is around 50% of
the average total employee health spending. He admits, given that he estimates switching
costs among PPO plans that are di¤erentiated only by nancial characteristics, his estimate
can be viewed as a lower bound on switching costs in a more general setting, like ours, where
switching costs can stem from having to adapt to di¤erent non-nancial characteristics, such
as pharmacy networks and drug formularies. Also, his estimate is based on choices made by
people of working age. Several studies have predicted or indirectly shown older people are likely
to have higher switching costs.25
Most of the coe¢ cients on the product characteristics have expected signs and are statisti-
cally signicant at the 5% level. The results are similar across the two cases and 6 specica-
tions. The only large di¤erence across specications comes on the LIS dummy which depends
on whether or not BenetEA is used as an instrument. Consumers prefer more generous cover-
age (lower deductibles and out-of-pocket prices in the initial coverage zone and donut hole) and
more extended pharmacy networks. Medicare beneciaries appear to be more sensitive to a $1
increase in the premium than in the deductible, which is sensible given that there is uncertainty
associated with meeting the deductible. This is also consistent with the Abaluck and Gruber
(2011)s estimation results based on individual data on plan choices and drug utilization. The
coe¢ cients on the price indices are both negative, more so for the donut hole price index. The
LIS dummy shows that LIS eligible plans experience a large shift in demand from receiving
randomly assigned individuals.
24MEDPAC, A Data Book: Medicare Part D program,March 2010. Dollar value gures deated to 2006
dollars.
25Strombom et al. (2002) relates the negative relationship between age and price sensitivity they found to
a possibly positive relationship between age and switching costs. Handel (2010) nds switchers are slightly
younger than stayers.
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5.1 Comparison with A Static Demand Model
We present the coe¢ cient estimates for a static demand model in the second to the last column
of table 2. As static models are misspecied in this environment, it is useful to compare static
and dynamic results to understand the direction and size of the bias. This is particularly im-
portant in applications where supply-side mark-ups are based on estimates of price elasticities.
The static model is estimated by the method described in Berry (1994) using the same moment
conditions as the dynamic model with serially independent plan qualities.
Compared to the dynamic model results, consumers appear to be more price sensitive (higher
in magnitude price coe¢ cient) in the static model. This may seem counter-intuitive at rst
glance. Suppose a plan experiences a small drop in its market share when its premium increases.
Static models that ignore state dependence would recover the present years mean utility level
only slightly lower than the past years and would hence deduce a low price sensitivity. Ex-
plaining this small drop in the market share in a dynamic setting with high switching costs
may require the present years utility level to be much lower than the past years. As such, one
may expect a high price sensitivity with a dynamic model that incorporates state dependence.
The above intuition, however, only considers the fact that switching costs give rise to state
dependence in consumers choices, and does not account for the forward-looking nature of
consumer behavior. It is important to recognize that it is the choice specic value that the
dynamic model recovers. How this value a¤ects todays ow utility level depends on ow utility
transition probabilities. In our application, the estimated transition probability distribution
implies that the current and future utility ows are positively related. Consequently, a drop
in todays ow utility gets amplied through the negative e¤ect on the continuation value.
That is, when a plan experiences a small drop in its market share when its price increases, the
dynamic model would recover a large drop in the choice specic value. But, that drop could
separate out into a relatively small drop in the current years ow utility and a relatively large
drop in the continuation value.
A properly specied dynamic model disentangles the e¤ect of todays price change on todays
ow utility from its e¤ect on the expected utility ows. Because a static demand model does
not subtract out the latter e¤ect, it may over- or under-estimate the marginal e¤ect of a
price change on ow utility. In our case, price sensitivity is biased up under the static model
specication. In the opposite case where the current level of ow utility is negatively related to
expectation about future utility ows, the static model specication is likely to under-estimate
the price sensitivity. Note that in a world with switching costs and myopic consumers, there
is no need to account for the continuation value, and price sensitivity estimates from a static
specication without switching costs would be unambiguously biased downwards.
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5.2 Robustness
To evaluate whether the parameter estimates of the switching cost are reasonable, we compare
predicted switching probabilities to actual ones. Recall that the average switching probability
was 12% between 2007 and 2008. This 12% switching gure includes low income subsidy (LIS)
beneciaries who were randomly reassigned after their previous plans became ineligible for the
full low income subsidy. The average switching probability among non-LIS beneciaries is only
6% implying signicant choice inertia.26
We do not model choices made by LIS beneciaries subject to auto-enrollment di¤erently
from those made by the non-LIS population because they are also allowed to freely choose plans
and because we do not have data on the population of LIS beneciaries for each market.27
Whereas the aggregate market share data used for estimation reect the 12% switching fre-
quency and changes in market shares induced by reassignment, our model assumes all switches
are voluntary and subject to the same level of switching costs. This discrepancy implies that the
estimated model may not be able to generate an average switching probability of 12% or of 6%.
Indeed, the implied switching probabilities from our estimates for the serially correlated case
lie in the middle, around 8%. Because the market shares used for estimation are less persistent
than they would otherwise be with a sample that includes only voluntary switches amongst non-
auto enrollees, we expect our models predicted switching frequency to be higher than 6%. On
the other hand, the fact that our model requires everyone to pay the switching cost including
those automatically reassigned tends to suppress the predicted switching probability because
it would associate the observed changes in market shares with more stays and fewer switches
than a model that incorporates random reassignment for the subset of auto-enrollees. Hence,
the predicted market share is likely to be lower than 12%. As such, the models implied switch-
ing frequency of 8% compares favorably to the benchmark gures from the 2008 micro data.
This suggests that our model and estimation algorithm based on aggregate market share data
performs fairly well with respect to replicating switching frequencies. It also implies that the
switching cost estimate reects the average value of switching costs that auto- and non-auto
enrollees are facing in this market.28
26This is based on the gure given in the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services Press Re-
lease, January 31, 2008: Medicare Prescription Drug Benets Projected Costs Continue to Drop.
(http://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=2868&intN)
27The switching cost for a randomly reassigned beneciary would be zero if all that mattered were the nancial
and psychological costs of nding an alternative plan. But it could be positive for other reasons, such as the
costs associated with adapting to the new plans drug formulary. As a dual eligible must take an action if she
wants to stay with the current plan, the switching cost may be negative for the auto-enrollment eligibles.
28We account for the e¤ect of random assignment on market shares by including a dummy variable for plans
that are eligible to receive randomly assigned LIS beneciaries. The LIS dummy (across-time changes in the
values) makes sure that some switches are because of changes in observable characteristics rather than changes
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In the last column in table 2, we present tentative estimates of the dynamic model where we
assume switchers from the outside option also pay the switching cost. The presented estimates
are only illustrative because the middle loop converges to di¤erent values of the mean utility
ow vector for di¤erent initial guesses. For each value of the switching cost, we solve the middle
loop for 12 di¤erent initial guesses, and then evaluate the GMM function for each resulting mean
utility ow vector. Although there was some trend, for example, the GMM values tend to be
smaller around a switching cost value of 3:7 than around, say, 4.0, some initial guesses result
in higher GMM values than others. We present the estimates that obtained the smallest GMM
value of all tested initial guesses and switching cost values. Although illustrative only, the
switching cost estimate under this model specication is much smaller both in the parameter
value (3.75) and in dollars ($1,485). This result is expected because the model requires the
level of switching costs to be small enough to rationalize the massive inux from the outside
option in the inception year 2006.
5.3 Dynamic Price Elasticities
In this subsection, we present various price elasticities calculated based on specication II-3 of
the serially correlated case. An increase in the premium a¤ects the market share of the plan
through three channels: 1) it lowers its own choice specic value by decreasing the current utility
ow; 2) it further lowers the continuation value through the estimated transition probabilities;
3) it reduces other planschoice specic values by lowering their continuation values through
decreases in the non-default option values.
Note that the e¤ect of the second and the third channel highly depends on the estimated
transition probability distributions. Table 4 presents the AR(1) process estimates of the two
state variables, utility ow (fjt) and non-default option value ( jt) for specication II-3 of the
serially correlated case. Both of the processes are stationary and exhibit positive autocorrela-
tion. The positive autocorrelation of the utility ow variable conrms our previous argument
on how consumers could appear to be more price sensitive in misspecied static models. The
fact that the autocorrelation of fjt is positive for all markets implies the expected value function
EV (fjt; ) is an increasing function in fjt for all markets. Similarly, the positive autocorrelation
of  jt causes the continuation value function EEV (;  jt) to be increasing in  jt.
Table 5 presents own price elasticities. In the table, Dyn-1 gives the price elasticity when
only the rst channel is accounted for, which is equivalent to a case where consumers believe
the price shock is purely temporary. Dyn-2 accounts for the rst two channels, and Dyn-3
in the unobservable or small switching costs. Therefore, without the LIS dummy variable, the given changes in
the market shares are likely to be rationalized by a smaller switching cost estimate.
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Table 4: Estimation Result: AR(1) Process of the State Variables
fjt  jt
mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
Number of observations 157.26 16.07 106 198 160.26 16.08 109 201
Constant -.338 .123 -.663 -.120 7.969 3.848 .190 17.620
AR(1) coe¢ cient .446 .052 .360 .618 .571 .149 .258 .950
 .864 .138 .678 1.220 .563 .072 .429 .725
R2 .349 .073 .208 .534 .114 .032 .043 .183
for all three channels. While the static model that assumes zero switching cost yields similar
price elasticities for both 2006 and later years, the dynamic switching cost model yields much
higher price elasticities for 2006 than the later years. The reason why Dyn-1 yields elasticities
lower than the static model is that the premium coe¢ cient estimate is slightly smaller for our
dynamic model (0.0437) than for the static model (0.0476). The dynamic model tends to yield
price elasticities much larger than the static model when the dynamic channels are accounted
for. The table shows the dynamic channels, particularly the second channel, are important in
determining the price elasticity. The third channel brings down price elasticities compared to
the case where consumers do not adjust their prospects of the other plans (Dyn-2), but the
e¤ect is minimal. As we argued above, static models do not di¤erentiate the rst and second
channel, and hence cannot analyze how a policy that changes expectations about the market
environment, such as regulations that limit radical changes in monthly premium and other plan
characteristics, will a¤ect market shares over time.
Table 6 presents lagged own price elasticities. In our model, an increase in a plans premium
Table 5: Own Price Elasticity
obs median mean s.d. min max
Static 1.7062 1.7617 0.6080 0.0816 4.6011
Dyn-1 1.5664 1.6173 0.5581 0.0749 4.2241
t = 2006
Dyn-2
1415
2.3954 2.4917 0.8772 0.1885 10.1945
Dyn-3 2.3742 2.4723 0.8709 0.1791 10.014
Static 1.6016 1.8198 0.8580 0.4218 6.2785
Dyn-1 1.2343 1.4047 0.8053 0.1032 5.7637
t  2007
Dyn-2
5139
1.7640 1.9565 0.9512 0.2412 8.3334
Dyn-3 1.7591 1.9504 0.9525 0.2361 8.3120
Dyn-1 considers a case where a change in the premium of plan k a¤ects neither expectation about
the future values of the mean utility ow of plan k nor the non-default option values of the other
plans while Dyn-3 is where it a¤ects both of them and also expectation about the future values
of the non-default option values. Dyn-2 is when it a¤ects only a¤ects the expectation about the
plans stream of utility ows but not the other plansnon-default option values.
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Table 6: Lagged Own Price Elasticity
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
obs mean obs mean obs mean
Dyn-1 0.6128 0.3643 0.2088
t = 2006
Dyn-3
1198
1.1612
1103
0.7379
963
0.4348
Dyn-1 0.3881 0.1641y
t  2007
Dyn-3
3072
0.6255
1361
0.2974y
y There we found three incidents with positive lagged own price elasticity.
in year t will a¤ect the plans market share not only in that year but also all the subsequent
years. A premium increase in 2006 has considerable e¤ects on the market share of the same plan
in the following years, but the e¤ects gradually decrease over time. These e¤ects are of course
greater when the increase alters consumers expectation about the future premium (Dyn-3)
compared to the case where the expectation is xed (Dyn-1). The e¤ects of a 1% premium
increase in 2007 on the future market shares are much smaller than, almost a half of, the e¤ects
from a 1% premium increase in 2006. The lagged own price elasticity does not always have to
be negative because an increase in a plans premium is likely to increase other plansmarket
shares in that period, which in turn could increase the pool of potential switchers. In fact, in
three out of 1,361 cases, a premium increase leads to an increase in the market share two years
later, although the magnitude is on the order of 1/10000.
Table 7 presents contemporary and lagged cross price elasticities. The mean cross price
elasticity is slightly higher for the dynamic model than the static model in 2006. As expected,
the dynamic model yields contemporary cross price elasticities much lower in 2007 compared
to 2006. While contemporary cross price elasticities are all positive in 2006, some are negative
in 2007, albeit only 224 out of over 256,000 cases. This occurs through the third channel: if
a plans premium increase lowers the other plans choice specic values by decreasing their
non-default option values, some plan that is most negatively a¤ected can experience a drop
in its market share. This shows how competing products can be complements in a dynamic
setting.
The mean lagged cross price elasticities decrease as the time lag increases. While the
majority of lagged cross price elasticities are still positive, there are many pairs of plans that
exhibit negative values of lagged cross price elasticity. This occurs when plan As premium
increase results in a decrease in plan Bs contemporary market share (through the third channel)
or a decrease in the pool of potential switchers for plan B. The share of pairs of plans with
negative lagged cross price elasticities increases as the time lag increases.
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Table 7: Cross Price Elasticity
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
mean neg (%) mean neg (%) mean neg (%) mean neg (%)
Static 0.0116 0
t = 2006 Dyn-1 0.0106 0 0.0070 9.3 0.0046 20.4 0.0031 29.7
Dyn-3 0.0196 0 0.0138 21.4 0.0091 32.9 0.0061 40.0
Static 0.0101 0
t  2007 Dyn-1 0.0047 0 0.0030 3.0 0.0018 13.1
Dyn-3 0.0081 0.1 0.0056 9.7 0.0035 21.7
neg(%) gives the share of pairs of plans with negative cross price elasticities.
5.4 Simulation: Welfare Loss
Abaluck and Gruber (2011) present a puzzle for this market that documents enrollees making
inconsistent choices. Using enrollee level data on Part D plan choices in 2006, they nd that
the average enrollee chooses a plan such that he overpays by 30.9 percent of the average total
Part D spending on premiums, deductibles and copays versus the lowest-cost plan. In dollar
terms, the average enrollee overpays by about $300 based on the average total Part D spending
of around $900. We attempt to estimate how much of this can be explained by enrolleese¤orts
to avoid switching costs in future years.
We simulate the choices of Part D eligibles based on model II-3 of the serially correlated
case. We compute the di¤erences in utility levels between the plans chosen by forward-looking
consumers, who face a switching cost of $1,689, and plans they would choose if there were no
switching costs. In the initial year, 2006, the average welfare loss is $5.1, which increases to
$465 for 2007, and around $480 for the years 2008 and 2009. The loss in the initial year is small
because the plan with the highest static ow utility is the same as the plan with the highest
choice specic value for most simulated consumers. The losses become signicantly larger in
later years as many enrollees choose to stick to their default plans as long as the present value
of the momentarily best plan is not su¢ ciently higher than that of the default plan to justify
paying the switching cost.
The welfare loss caused by switching costs in the years after 2006 is on the same order of
magnitude as the results in Abaluck and Gruber (2011). However, it should be noted that
the result in Abaluck and Gruber (2011) is based on 2006 choices before enrollees became
locked-in, and our simulated welfare loss due to forward-looking behavior in that year is very
small. Thus, forward-looking behavior does not resolve the choice inconsistency puzzle, and
the behavioral and informational explanations examined in their study remain valid. However,
given our simulations, we would expect results from their analysis performed in years after 2006
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to yield larger welfare losses as enrollees got locked-in to their sub-optimal choices.
The issue of choice inconsistency is an important policy matter. Based on behavioral and
informational explanations, one of the proposed policy prescriptions is to limit the number
of plan o¤erings. However, if enrollees tend to make sub-optimal choices when they enroll in
Medicare Part D plans for the rst time and can resolve their sub-optimal choices by switching
plans, then policies aimed at reducing switching costs such as those enacted in the 2010
Patient and Protection and A¤ordable Care Act for low income households will be as
important as those that help them make the right choices in the rst place.
5.5 Switching Costs and Persistent Consumer Heterogeneity
Our model incorporates persistency in consumer preferences via time-invariant coe¢ cients on
observed product characteristics. However, heterogeneity in consumer preferences is only mo-
mentary. This may lead our switching cost estimates to be biased upward. Without individual-
level data, there are two ways of modeling persistent heterogeneity in consumer preferences:
persistent random coe¢ cients and serially correlated idiosyncratic preference shocks. The lat-
ter could potentially absorb a lot of choice inertia and hence lower switching cost estimates.
However, such a model is infeasible because the degree of serial correlation cannot be identied
separately from the switching cost.
The former alternative does not su¤er from non-identication because variation in the dis-
tribution of plan characteristics across markets in the programs initial year 2006 would identify
the random coe¢ cients, as in Berry et al. (1995).29 However, in contrast to the autocorrelated
error term alternative, a random coe¢ cient model is not guaranteed to yield a lower switching
cost estimate. Generally speaking, under the environment where product attributes of default
options also evolve, time-invariant random coe¢ cients may or may not generate more persistent
matches between plans and enrollees at the aggregate level than time-invariant non-random co-
e¢ cients. It ultimately depends on the interaction between distributions of random coe¢ cients
and the evolution of product characteristics. We believe in our case that omitting random
coe¢ cients does not necessarily cause a systematic bias of the switching cost parameter.
The main issue with a dynamic random coe¢ cient model is the computational burden.
29When one lacks the period 0 data, identication of consumer heterogeneity (levels of standard deviations of
random coe¢ cients), mean preference, and the switching cost is very tricky. In the static model, disproportionate
substitution patterns among products with similar product attributes in the same period is associated with a
high standard deviation. However, in the dynamic model, products with similar attributes in period t may have
very di¤erent distributions of consumer types while products with di¤erent attributes may have a very similar
distribution of consumer types to start with. Therefore, knowledge of or assumptions on the initial condition
of the distribution of consumer types attached to each product is critical in identifying degrees of consumer
heterogeneity.
37
With random coe¢ cients, we cannot use our method to recover values of the (mean) choice
specic value function from observed markets shares by simply solving a system of equations,
and we also cannot use the functional relationship between the mean utility ow and the (mean)
choice specic value function.30 Instead, we would need to simulate forward-looking consumers,
solve a dynamic programming problem for each simulated consumer, and compute model-
predicted market shares at each trial value of the vector of mean utility ows. The method
proposed by Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009) take exactly this approach to incorporate
random coe¢ cients.
Under such a method, having a reasonable number of simulation draws to obtain precise
estimates can be extremely time-consuming.31 The computational burden is further increased
when a xed-point algorithm is not monotonically convergent. For example, the dynamic
analog of the BLP xed point algorithm in Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009) is not likely a
contraction mapping, even when it is applied to a non-random coe¢ cients model. A su¢ cient
condition for the BLP algorithm to be contractive is that all products are (weakly) substitutes.32
In a dynamic discrete choice model, competing products can be complements. For example, in
our switching cost model, suppose plan 1s predicted market share is smaller than the observed
one whereas plan 2s is larger. Then the BLP algorithm will increase plan 1s mean utility
while decreasing plan 2s for the next iteration. This leads to a lower non-default option value
for plan 1 and a higher non-default option value for plan 2 than in the previous iteration.
Because the choice specic value function is increasing in the non-default option value, plan
1s predicted market share may further decrease and plan 2s market share further increases
after the iteration. In this example, plan 1 and plan 2 are complements.33 As a result, the
convergence process of a dynamic analog of the BLP xed point algorithm can be stalled, and
it is not easy to derive a xed point operator with a more e¢ cient updating algorithm.34
30Suppose each consumer types utility ow can be written as: fij = 
f
j + ij and that we parameterize the
distribution of ij . Let csvj denote the mean choice specic value function, and suppose we write each consumer
types choice specic value function as csvij = csvj + bij . Note that the distribution of bij is di¤erent from the
distribution of ij . Also, the mean choice specic value function csvj is di¤erent from the choice specic value
function of the consumer type whose fij = 
f
j : Hence, modifying our method to incorporate random coe¢ cients
is not tractable in practice.
31Nosal (2011) rejects persistent preference heterogeneity in the Medicare Advantage market in her estimation
with 20 simulated Medicare beneciaries.
32See Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) for the proof.
33This occurred occasionally through the course of convergence when we tried to estimate a dynamic random
coe¢ cient model using the method by Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009).
34Also, the numerical instability of the logit-class of models that occurs for simulation draws on the tail of
the extreme value distribution (see Skrainka and Judd (2011)) can hinder rapid convergence, especially near the
boundaries of a sparsely discretized state space. A densely discretized state space with a su¢ ciently small lower
and large upper bound will improve the numerical instability, but it will increase the computational burden.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an algorithm to estimate dynamic discrete choice models of product
di¤erentiation using aggregate market share data and apply the method to estimate switching
costs in the Medicare Part D market.
We model consumers in the Medicare Part D market as forward-looking decision makers
who choose plans that solve their dynamic programming problems. If enrollees choose plans
other than their default plans, they will have to pay switching costs. They base their decisions
on the planscurrent utility ows, derived from product characteristics such as prices and the
generosity of drug coverage, as well as expectations about future product characteristics and
the switching costs they face now and will in the future.
We estimate the switching cost parameter and coe¢ cients on plan characteristics by re-
covering the mean ow utility for each plan and then forming moment conditions that put
restrictions on unobserved plan qualities. To this end, we develop an estimation algorithm that
maps aggregate market shares to mean ow utilities in two steps. We rst back out values of
the choice specic function for all plans at each switching cost value. We do this by solving
a system of non-linear equations that relate the distribution of the current market shares to
conditional choice probabilities and the distribution of past market shares. We then search for
the vector of mean utility ows that is consistent with the recovered choice specic values using
a xed point algorithm, dened using the functional relationship between the two variables.
The advantage of breaking down the complicated mapping between aggregate market shares
and mean utility ows into two simple mappings is that the algorithm can achieve a faster con-
vergence rate than the dynamic analogue of the BLP algorithm proposed by Gowrisankaran and
Rysman (2009). The disadvantage is that it does not allow for random coe¢ cients. Given the
trade-o¤s, our method is best suited for dynamic discrete choice models where the convergence
of the dynamic BLP algorithm may not be easily obtained. Convergence can be hampered in
cases where some products are dynamic complements rather than substitutes. Our method
is also useful when the identication of random coe¢ cients is somewhat dubious because of
limited information on the initial state of the consumer type distribution and when random
coe¢ cients are not of rst order importance.
The estimation results indicate a high switching cost around $1,500 to $1,700. The esti-
mated dollar values of the switching cost are around 50% to 60% of the annual drug spending
per enrollee and more than the sum of the annual premium payment and out-of-pocket drug
expenditure. The values are consistent with previous studies on health care plans. We then
perform a counterfactual simulation to calculate the welfare loss due to switching costs. The
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average welfare loss ranges from $450 to $480 against the hypothetical zero switching friction
world.
In our application to the Medicare Part D, there are many sources for switching frictions.
Although it may important to disentangle the sources to enact e¤ective policies, doing so is
beyond the scope of this paper, especially given that we work with aggregate market share
data. One may be able to separately identify psychological switching costs from the others by
looking at enrollment patterns of auto-enrolled LIS households whose plans lose LIS eligibility.
This subset of households has to pay costs from breaking down procrastination or inattention to
actively enroll in their current plans to avoid the switching costs related to learning and trans-
action costs. This extension would require data on the population eligible for auto-enrollment
(full Medicaid coverage) in each market, which is not yet publicly available.
More interesting work can be added by modeling the supply side in a dynamic setting to
study how insurers interact with inertial consumers under imperfect competition. Given the
large switching cost estimates, supply-side incentives are likely to be dictated by a trade-o¤
between investing with low prices to attract new consumers and harvesting with high
prices to take prots from locked in consumers (Klemperer, 1995; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007;
Dubé et al., 2009). There is anecdotal evidence that Part D plans have engaged in this behav-
ior.35 The current Medicare Part D regulations may further encourage invest-then-harvest
incentives through the way in which premium subsidies are tied to lagged market shares. As
shown in Miller and Yeo (2012), even in the static world, insurers with large lagged market
shares face more inelastic residual demand and hence have a stronger incentive to raise prices,
which will lead to a rise in the government subsidy amount. One can examine how subsidy
rules interacts with invest-then-harvestincentives in insurerspricing decisions in search for
welfare-improving subsidy rules that better reect the markets dynamic environment. We leave
this to future work.
35In the rst year of the program, 2006, Humana priced its plans at an average of $24 lower than the national
average and captured the number 2 market share. In subsequent years it raised prices, up to $6 above the nation
average in 2009, and was able to retain its number 2 market share.
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A Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Part D Basic Benet Structure
Table 8: Number of Insurers and Plan O¤erings
Insurers All Plans Basic Enhanced
2006 17.8 41.6 23.9 17.7
2007 22.4 52.1 26.4 25.7
2008 22.0 52.7 25.9 26.8
2009 20.9 46.4 21.0 25.4
Number of insurer and plan o¤erings averaged across 34 markets.
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Table 9: Average Monthly Premium
Market share-weighted
Monthly Premium
Premium ($)
obs mean s.d. min max obs mean s.d. min max
2006 1415 37.26 12.67 1.87 99.9 34 26.88 2.96 21.24 35.59
2007 1770 35.51 14.89 9.24 131.94 34 26.95 2.83 19.66 32.66
2008 1791 37.24 18.62 9.18 100.66 34 28.23 3.29 20.32 33.79
2009 1578 43.11 19.43 9.68 128.55 34 32.48 3.31 23.70 38.90
All gures are in 2006 dollars.
Table 10: Rate of Enrollment in Stand-alone Part D Plans
Market-Level National-Level
Enrollment Rate (%) Enrollment Rate (%)
year obs mean s.d. min max Stand-alone Part D MA + Part D
2006 34 37.8 9.2 18.5 58.5 36.9 14.7
2007 34 38.1 8.9 18.7 59.1 37.4 16.1
2008 34 37.8 8.7 18.4 57.9 37.2 19.6
2009 34 34.7 8.6 14.6 54.8 36.4 21.5
Table 11: Market Shares of Stand-alone Part D Plans
Market Shares (%) Share of Market Leader (%)
year obs mean s.d. obs mean s.d. min max
2006 1415 0.91 1.69 34 8.2 2.6 3.8 16.5
2007 1770 0.73 1.57 34 8.2 2.8 4.0 18.1
2008 1791 0.72 1.42 34 7.2 2.8 3.9 18.5
2009 1578 0.75 1.40 34 6.7 2.0 3.5 12.0
Those who choose not to enroll in any stand-alone part D plan include enrollees in MA plans
without any PDP coverage, enrollees in MA+PDP plans, enrollees in RDS(Retiree Drug Subsidy)
sponsored plans, and non-enrollees. b: in 2006 dollars
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Table 12: Exited Plans
Mean Number of plans Sum of market shares (%) Average market share (%)
All plans Exited plans All Exited All Exited*
2006 41.618 0.059 37.778 7.65e-04 0.922 0.0131
2007 52.059 1.176 38.141 0.0285 0.738 0.0242
2008 52.676 2.382 37.816 0.0804 0.723 0.0338
2009 46.412 0.588 34.347 0.1097 0.752 0.1864
The gures are the mean of each variable across 34 markets except the average market share
of exited plans, which takes the average across exited plans.
Table 13: Number of Top 100 Drugs Included in Formularies
# of # of # of top 100 drugs included
year
plans formularies mean s.d.
2006 1415 93 90:54 5:96
2007 1770 101 92:02 5:98
2008 1791 88 89:12 7:61
2009 1578 89 86:72 9:12
Table 14: Out-of-Pocket Drug Price Indices
Initial Coverage PI Donut Hole PI
obs mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
2006 1415 63.78 9.19 38.53 85.23 95.06 5.58 51.57 101.08
2007 1770 59.05 9.16 41.48 77.78 93.69 5.72 49.77 106.32
2008 1791 55.12 10.34 27.29 73.93 93.96 4.89 74.15 106.32
2009 1578 52.29 10.35 22.56 68.59 93.83 5.43 77.06 106.32
All gures are in 2006 dollars. For o¤-formulary drugs, the consumer pays full retail price. As
we do not have data on retail drug prices, we assume the consumers pay the regional or national
average negotiated drug price. All 100 drugs are evenly weighted in the index.
Table 15: Deductible and Network Pharmacies
Deductible (monthly) # Network Pharmacies
(in 2006 dollars) per Eligible Beneciarya
obs mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
2006 1415 7.66 9.67 0 20.83 0.142 0.023 0.063 0.376
2007 1770 7.24 9.75 0 21.47 0.138 0.020 0.056 0.193
2008 1791 8.10 10.04 0 21.46 0.135 0.020 0.061 0.190
2009 1578 8.69 10.70 0 23.10 0.136 0.018 0.073 0.186
a: in hundredth.
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Table 16: Low Income Subsidy (LIS) and Enhanced Plan (BenetEA) Dummy
BenetEA dummy LIS dummy
obs mean s.d. min* max* mean s.d. min* max*
2006 1415 .425 .494 .365 .500 .289 .453 .143 .390
2007 1770 .493 .500 .455 .531 .356 .479 .164 .491
2008 1791 .509 .500 .472 .558 .276 .447 .096 .384
2009 1578 .547 .498 .527 .583 .176 .381 .023 .304
* min and max are the minimum and maximum over 34 marketsmean values.
Table 17: Year-to-Year Changes in Product Characteristics
xt+1   xt
x obs mean s.d. min max
Monthly Premium 4270 2.960 10.767 -50.136 74.536
Monthly Deductible 4270 -0.241 5.359 -21.472 21.472
BenetEA dummy 4270 0.043 0.227 -1 1
Initial Coverage PI 4270 -4.295 7.865 -42.339 19.783
Donut Hole PI 4270 -0.374 3.242 -12.882 37.035
pharm per eligible (1000) 4270 -.009 0.099 -2.232 0.854
LIS dummy 4270 -0.073 0.379 -1 1
Table 18: AR(1) Process of Product Characteristics
X Constant AR(1) coe¢ cient R2
Monthly Premium 4.80* 0.95* 0.65
Monthly Deductible 0.77* 0.87* 0.73
BenetEA dummy 0.09* 0.90* 0.81
Initial Coverage PI 12.69* 0.71* 0.49
Donut Hole PI 19.79* 0.79* 0.64
pharm per eligible (1000) 0.29* 0.78* 0.78
LIS dummy 0.06* 0.60* 0.42
The regression equation is Xt = 0 + 1Xt 1. The results are based on 4270 observations across
years and regions. *: estimates are signicant at 1%
46
B Appendix
We maintain the assumptions on the transition probability distribution given in 3.1.3:
P (fjt+1;  jt+1 j fjt;  jt) = Pr(fjt+1 j fjt) Pr( jt+1 j  jt) and the conditional distribution of
fjt+1 is normal with mean 11
f
jt+12 and standard deviation 1 and the conditional distribution
of  jt+1 is also normal with 21 jt + 22 and 2. Let i(; x) denotes the normal distribution
function with mean i1x + i2 and standard deviation i for each i = 1; 2. Let Z denote the
standard normal random variable and (z) denote the distribution function.
Proof Assume 
j11j
1
< 1. Consider x1; x2 2 R. Without loss of generality, suppose x2 x1 >
0. We want to show that eT (sc;Mt)(x) = cvjt(sc;Mt) +   EEV (0;  0t(sc;Mt))    
EEV (x; y) is contractive for any value of y. That is,
 eT (sc;Mt) (x2)  eT (sc;Mt) (x1) =
 jEEV (x2; y)  EEV (x1; y))j   jx2   x1j for some 0 <  < 1:
Note that EEV (x; y) =
Z Z
EV (x0; y0)d2(y
0; y)d1(x
0; x) =
1
1
Z Z
EV (1z + 11x +
12; y
0)d2(y
0; y)d(z) with the change of variables z =
x0   (11x+ 12)
1
: Without loss of
generality, suppose 11 > 0 for illustration purpose.
jEEV (x2; y)  EEV (x1; y)j
=
1
1
Z Z EV (1z + 11x2 + 12; y0)d2(y0; y)d(z)  Z Z EV (1z + 11x1 + 12; y0)d2(y0; y)d(z)
=
1
1
Z Z [EV (1z + 11x2 + 12; y0)  EV (1z + 11x1 + 12; y0)] d2(y0; y)d(z)
=
1
1
Z Z [ln ( exp(y0)+exp(1z+11x2+12)) ln ( exp(y0)+exp(1z+11x1+12))] d2(y0; y)d(z)
=
1
1
Z Z ln  exp(y0) + exp(1z + 11x2 + 12) exp(y0) + exp(1z + 11x1 + 12)

d2(y
0; y)d(z)

 1
1
Z Z ln exp(1z + 11x2 + 12)exp(1z + 11x1 + 12)

d2(y
0; y)d(z)

=
1
1
Z Z ln [exp(11x2   11x1)] d2(y0; y)d(z) = j11j1 jx2   x1j
The inequality follows from the mathematical fact that
t2 + c
t1 + c
 t2
t1
if c  0 and t2  t1: Hence,
jT (sc;Mt) (x2)  T (sc;Mt) (x1)j =  jEEV (x2; y)  EEV (x1; y)j   j11j
1
jx2   x1j. Assum-
ing 
j11j
1
< 1; the operator T is contractive.
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